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| 2. |
- Newlove-Eriksson, Lindy, et al.
(författare)
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Governance Beyond the Global: Who Controls the Extraterrestrial?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Globalizations. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1474-7731 .- 1474-774X. ; 10:2, s. 277-292
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How is outer space governed? This article argues that private authority is gaining salience in space politics, even with respect to the traditionally state-centric security and military aspects of space. Further, while commercial actors have always played a role in space programs, three significant changes can be detected: transnational conglomerates and consortia as opposed to individual corporations are emerging as key partners in space politics; private partners are gaining stronger and wider responsibilities for the development and management of space programs (including manned spaceflights); and public accountability is increasingly at stake due to a widening of security in space policy. The latter development includes a blurring of key distinctions between military and civilian usage (also referred to as dual-use or dual-role application), as well as between the public and private realms.
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| 3. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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Cyber security in Sweden and China : Going on the Attack?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Conflict in Cyberspace. - London : Routledge. - 9781138947788 - 9781315669878 ; , s. 83-94
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Introduction In recent years Western pundits and politicians have played up the specter of a new digital divide, between opposing democratic and authoritarian information orders, by at times even labeled an Internet cold war 2.0. The term digital divide originally explained unequal access to the Internet and digital information resources inside and between countries (Norris 2001). The new digital divide was not about unequal access to the Internet and digital information resources. It was political in nature due to different conceptions of liberties, freedom of expression, and how information flows should be governed nationally and internationally. Most notably, former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in her by now well-known talk in Washington DC on January 21, 2010, emphasized that an “information curtain” had descended between free and closed nations of the world (Clinton 2010). Clinton, invoked and echoed Winston Churchill’s famous words on the iron curtain that came to divide Europe for more than fifty years when she in Washington DC said: “an information curtain now separates the free from the unfree.” Two years later, the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) World Conference on International Communications (WCIT-12) meeting, which negotiated a revision to the 1988 international telecommunications regulations (ITR), broke down on vague wordings on Internet governance in the final resolution on December 14, 2012. Subsequently, The Economist magazine ran the headline “A digital cold war?” (Dubai 2012). However, the leaks by Edward Snowden in June 2013 radically changed the nature of the debate on Internet freedom and Internet security, although black-and-white dichotomies between the “free world” and the “unfree world” remain remarkably persistent, even after Snowden, a former employee with a contractor of the National Security Agency of the United States, revealed the enormous extent of surveillance and monitoring of individual citizens worldwide and in the USA. As statements by US congressmen about Chinese spyware infiltrating the mobile phones of Hong Kong activists illustrate, hypocrisy and myth making about “good” and “evil” surveillance is very much alive (Farrell and Finnemore 2013). Internet governance issues, however, are not black-and-white uncomplicated issues on either side of the imagined cyber curtain separating the free from the unfree (cf. Stalla-Bourdin et al. 2014). Russia, China and Iran are autocratic but not totalitarian countries. They showcase complex authoritarian-capitalist settings, which in the cases of Russia and Iran entail constrained but, nevertheless, electoral politics. Unlike totalitarian North Korea, these countries are not isolated from the rest of the world, but are deeply involved in social and economic globalization. And in China, interestingly, the state cannot fully trust private commercial companies to fully comply with the party-state’s intent to censor and monitor citizens’ communication over social networks. The remainder of this chapter discusses Swedish and Chinese cyber-security strategy, focusing on threat perceptions, cyber-security methods and organization. Why compare Sweden and China? The main reason is that while both have relatively advanced information societies and cyber-security measures, they represent on the one hand a parliamentary democracy, and on the other an autocratic political system. While many other democracies and autocracies could have been chosen, Sweden and China are particularly interesting given their difference in size and position in the global system. Also, while the USA is a leading cyber power, and thus in a sense a major geopolitical counterpart of China, we are not here analyzing the balance of cyber power, but are mainly interested in differences and similarities between democracy and autocracy concerning cyber security. And while US cyber-security policies have been extensively discussed elsewhere (Mueller and Kuehn 2013; Dunn Cavelty 2008), there is hardly any studies on Swedish cyber security (for exceptions, see Eriksson 2001a, 2001b, 2004). Moreover, our particular expertise on Swedish and Chinese cyber politics is a pragmatic reason for studying these rather than any other countries. It should also be made clear that we conceive of cyber security in a broad sense. Cyber security, as we understand it, includes defensive measures against cyber attacks such as firewalls and CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) functions, offensive measures such as computer hacking and denial of service attacks, and cyber surveillance and cyber espionage (Andreasson 2012; Dunn Cavelty 2008).
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| 4. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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Cyberspace in Space : Fragmentation, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty
- 2022
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Ingår i: Cyber Security Politics. - London : Routledge. - 9780367626747 - 9781003110224 ; , s. 95-107
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- What are the consequences of making cyberspace increasingly reliant on satellites and other types of space infrastructure? And what is the meaning and significance of an interplanetary cyberspace? The chapter addresses these developments specifically concerning infrastructure, militarization, and privatization. The consequences observed are summed up as fragmentation, vulnerability, and uncertainty. Cyberspace in space implies fragmentation in terms of stakeholders and governance, and ultimately in terms of power and accountability. Vulnerability increases as cyberspace becomes satellite-based (space is certainly not a safe environment, and satellites can be attacked by anti-satellite weapons as well as new forms of hacking and denial of service. Uncertainty of is tremendous particularly both in terms of what norms and principles will apply (compare the debate on Internet freedom vs. Internet sovereignty), and whether militarization or civilian and even utopian ideas will prevail.
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| 5. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-
(författare)
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Frontier politics : The realm of dreamers
- 2015
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Ingår i: Global Affairs. - London : Taylor & Francis. - 2334-0460 .- 2334-0479. ; 1:4-5, s. 365-367
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 6. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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International Relations, Digital Security, and Content Analysis : A Constructivist Approach
- 2014
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Ingår i: International Relations and the Global Politics of Science and Technology. - Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer. - 9783642550096 ; , s. 205-219
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The development and global diffusion of access to the Internet has—as is the case with most new and game-changing technologies—been accompanied with fears and threat perceptions. This chapter argues, on the one hand, that Constructivist IR theory is particularly suited for addressing and interpreting the threat discourses and identity issues which come in focus in cybersecurity. The ease with which cyber-culprits can hide their identity and location, operating through networks of hijacked computers across the world, makes fear-mongering threat and identity discourses a key issue in cybersecurity. On the other hand, this chapter presents content analysis—a set of quantitative methods focusing on key word searches—as a pertinent or even ubiquitous method for both the study and practice of cybersecurity. Through simple and globally accessible interfaces, the entire Web can be scrutinized using content analysis. Equipped with Constructivist theory and content analysis methods, the IR scholar stands prepared to uncover and better understand the massive discursive world of the Internet.
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| 7. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-
(författare)
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Konstruktivism
- 2021. - 4
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Ingår i: Internationella relationer. - Lund : Studentlitteratur AB. - 9789144139463 ; , s. 131-138
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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Who controls the Internet? : Beyond the obstinacy or obsolescence of the state
- 2009
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Ingår i: International Studies Review. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1521-9488 .- 1468-2486. ; 11:1, s. 206-230
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- With the Internet being a truly global phenomenon, understanding how this is controlled should yield observations of relevance for the study of global governance more generally. The Internet, and how it is controlled, should therefore be a concern for all students of world politics, and not only for the smaller albeit multidisciplinary community of scholars engaging in ‘‘Internet studies.’’ A first step is to acknowledge that Internet control varies across time, space, and issue-areas. To better understand such complex patterns of governance, we need to go beyond universal generalizations. In an attempt to support the middle-range theorizing, which arguably is needed, this essay introduces and briefly unpacks three analytical questions: What are the key aspects of Internet control? What actors might control what aspects of the Internet? And, finally, under what conditions are different types of actors likely to control various aspects of the Internet?
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| 10. |
- Eriksson, Johan, Professor, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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Worlds apart, worlds together : Converging and diverging frames in climate and energy governance
- 2019
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Ingår i: Globalizations. - : Routledge. - 1474-7731 .- 1474-774X. ; 16:1, s. 67-82
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper argues that past research has overlooked how the way problems and solutions are framed contribute to a prevailing gap in the global governance of climate and energy. Empirically, this paper investigates the frames of energy and climate change as expressed in key documents from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Energy Agency (IEA). Partly in contrast to past research, this paper finds (1) that there is a growing similarity in how the IPCC and IEA frame climate and energy; (2) that the IEA has gone from ignoring to acknowledging climate change and the transformation to a low-carbon energy system; and (3) that there is a prevailing difference in emphasis, whereas the IPCC only marginally discuss energy, while the IEA is still mainly talking about energy needs and fossil fuels even if climate change and renewables have entered their agenda.
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