| 1. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Privatization and quality : evidence from elderly care in Sweden
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Health Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-6296 .- 1879-1646. ; 49, s. 109-119
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mortality rates – an important and not easily contractible quality dimension – using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition significantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates.
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| 2. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Foreign ownership and investment : do firms locate investments close to the headquarter?
- 2011
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Ingår i: Review of World Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1610-2878 .- 1610-2886. ; 147:4, s. 621-642
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using an international panel data set of the European pulp and paper industry, we address the issue of a possible home-bias effect for real investments in plants with foreign and domestic locations. We find that there is no effect after controlling for firm effects and plant and firm size. These findings are rubust to a number of different econometric specifications, including a difference-in-difference approach. Our findings appear to be relevant for the debate on the effect of foreign takeovers. As far as we are aware, home-bias effects in real investments within multinational firms have not been studied previously.
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| 3. |
- Bergman, Mats A., 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging
- 2020
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Ingår i: Review of Industrial Organization. - : Springer. - 0889-938X .- 1573-7160. ; 56:1, s. 107-130
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We evaluate whether an econometric technique that is used in the spatial econometrics and network effects literature can be adopted as a test for collusive bidding in public procurement auctions. The proposed method is applied to the Swedish asphalt cartel that was discovered in 2001. Our dataset covers the period 1995–2009, which makes it possible to test for conditional independence between complementary cartel bids before and after 2001. Our estimates show a significant positive correlation between complementary cartel bids during the cartel period, whereas a non-significant correlation is shown during the later period. The variance of the parameter estimate of interest also differs between the periods, which suggests a structural change in bidding behavior among cartel members between the two periods.
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| 4. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Reforming the Swedish pharmaceuticals market : Consequences for costs per defined daily dose
- 2016
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Ingår i: International Journal of Health Economics and Management. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 2199-9023 .- 2199-9031. ; 16:3, s. 201-214
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In 2009 and 2010, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. One of the stated policy goals was to achieve low costs for pharmaceutical products dispensed in Sweden. We use price and sales data for off-patent brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals to estimate a log-linear regression model, allowing us to assess how the policy changes affected the cost per defined daily dose. The estimated effect is an 18 % cost reduction per defined daily dose at the retail level and a 34 % reduction in the prices at the wholesale level (pharmacies’ purchase prices). The empirical results suggest that the cost reductions were caused by the introduction of a price cap, an obligation to dispense the lowest-cost generic substitute available in the whole Swedish market, and the introduction of well-defined exchange groups. The reforms thus reduced the cost per defined daily dose for consumers while being advantageous also for the pharmacies, who saw their retail margins increase. However, pharmaceutical firms supplying off-patent pharmaceuticals experienced a clear reduction in the price received for their products.
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| 5. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Large investments in the pulp and paper industry : A count-data regression analysis
- 2002
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Ingår i: Journal of Forest Economics. - : Now Publishers Inc.. - 1104-6899 .- 1618-1530. ; 8, s. 29-52
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper analyses the effects of price and market size variables on the investment propensities in the pulp and paper industry. A panel of 15 European countries in the time period 1988-1997 is used in the regression analysis. We find the wages, the USD/ECU exchange rate, the price of paper and the installed production capacity to be the main determinants of large investments in this industry. Our measure of market size has no - or only very small - effects.
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| 6. |
- Bergman, Mats A., 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Squeezing the last drop out of your suppliers : an empirical study of market-based purchasing policies for generic pharmaceuticals
- 2017
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Ingår i: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0305-9049 .- 1468-0084. ; 79:6, s. 969-996
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the effect of the degree of exclusivity for the lowest bidder on the averageprice of generic pharmaceuticals in the short and long terms. Our results indicate that a1-percentage-point gain in market share of the lowest bidder reduces average costs by 0.2%in the short term and 0.8% in the long term, but also reduces the number of firms by 1%.We find that reducing the number of firms has a strong positive (and hence counteracting)effect on average prices, a 1% reduction raising prices by approximately 1%.
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| 7. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public procurement
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management. - Oxford : Elsevier. - 1478-4092 .- 1873-6505. ; 19:2, s. 73-83
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The EU procurement directives stipulate that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the bidder with the economically most advantageous tender; the latter requiring that a scoring rule be specified. We provide a simple theoretical framework, based on standard microeconomic theory, for tender evaluation (scoring and weighing) and discuss the pros and cons of methods such as highest quality (beauty contest), lowest price and price-and-quality-based evaluations. We argue that the most common method, price-to-quality scoring, is inappropriate for several reasons. It is non-transparent, making accurate representation of the procurer's preferences difficult. It is often open to strategic manipulation, due to dependence on irrelevant alternatives, and it tends to impose particular and unjustified non-linearity in bid prices. The alternative quality-to-price scoring method, where money values are assigned to different quality levels, is a better alternative. However, when the cost of quality is relatively well-known and several providers can offer optimal quality lowest price is the preferable award criteria, while beauty contests may be preferred when purchasing budgets are inflexible.
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| 8. |
- Granlund, David, 1979-, et al.
(författare)
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Price competition in pharmaceuticals : evidence from 1303 Swedish markets
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Health Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0167-6296 .- 1879-1646. ; 61, s. 1-12
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the short- and long-term price effects of the number of competing firms, using panel-data on 1303 distinct pharmaceutical markets for 78 months within a reference-price system. We use actual transaction prices in an institutional setting with little scope for non-price competition and where simultaneity problems can be addressed effectively. In the long term, the price of generics is found to decrease by 81% when the number of firms selling generics with the same strength, form and similar package size is increased from 1 to 10. Nearly only competition at this fine-grained level matters; the effect of firms selling other products with the same active substance, but with different package size, form, or strength, is only a tenths as large. Half of the price reductions take place immediately and 70% within three months. Also, prices of originals are found to react to competition, but far less and much slower.
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| 9. |
- Lundberg, Sofia, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
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Tendering design when price and quality is uncertain
- 2017
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Ingår i: International Journal of Public Sector Management. - : Emerald Group Publishing Limited. - 0951-3558 .- 1758-6666. ; 30:4, s. 310-327
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze how local and central authorities choose between lowest price and more complex scoring rules when they design supplier-selection mechanisms for public procurements. Five hypotheses are tested: a high level of cost uncertainty and highly non-verifiable quality makes the use of the lowest-price supplier-selection method less likely. Organizational habits and transaction-cost considerations influence the choice of mechanism. Strong quality concerns make complex rules more likely.Design/methodology/approach – The analysis departures from normative theory (rational choice) and is based on the regression analysis and survey data comprising a gross sample of 40 contracting authorities and detailed information about 651 procurements.Findings – More complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality. Authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partly driven by local habits and institutional inertia.Practical implications – The authors argue that, from a normative point of view, lowest price is an adequate method when the degree of uncertainty is low, for example, because the procured products are standardized and since quality can be verified. When there is significant cost uncertainty, it is better to use the so-called economically most advantageous tender (EMAT) method. (Preferably this should be done by assigning monetary values to different quality levels.) If there is significant uncertainty concerning delivered quality, the contracting authority should retain a degree of discretion, so as to be able to reward good-quality performance in observable but non-verifiable quality dimensions; options to extend the contract and subjective assessments of quality are two possibilities. The main findings are that EMAT and more complex scoring rules are used more often when the contracting authorities report that they experience substantial uncertainty concerning delivered quality and actual costs and that these factors tend to decrease the weight given to price, in line with the predictions. However, the authors also find that this result is mainly driven by variations between authorities, rather than by between-products variation for the same authority. This is from a training of professionals and regulation perspective of policy relevance.Social implications – Contract allocation based on habits rather than rational ground could implicate the waste of resources (tax payers money) as it adventures the matching of the preferences of the public sector (the objective, subject matter, of the procurement) and what the potential supplier offers in its tender.Originality/value – Although the principles for supplier selection are regulated by law they give the contracting authority substantial freedom in designing the scoring rule and in choosing what quality criteria to use. The tension between different objectives and the more general question whether the choices made by authorities reflect rational decision making or institutional inertia together motivate the current study. While the design of the supplier-selection mechanism is an important consideration in procurement practice, it has attracted relatively little attention from the academic community.
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