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- Bergman, Mats A., 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Comparing merger policies in the European Union and the United States
- 2010
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Ingår i: Review of Industrial Organization. - : Springer. - 0889-938X .- 1573-7160. ; 36:4, s. 305-331
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We collect a sample of EU and US merger investigations, estimate models of the regulatory decisions, and use the models to compare merger policies. Our approach allows us to decompose observed differences into policy effects and case-mix effects. Focusing on dominance mergers, we find that the EU is tougher than the US on average, in particular for mergers resulting in moderate market shares. However, the US appears to be more aggressive for coordinated interaction and non-dominance unilateral effects cases. Overall, our analysis detects substantial differences in policies, but it does not classify one regime as being more aggressive than the other.
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- Bergman, Mats, et al.
(författare)
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Merger Control in the European Union and The United States : Just the Facts
- 2011
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Ingår i: European Competition Journal. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1744-1056 .- 1757-8396. ; 7:1, s. 89-125
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts European Union (EU) and United States (US) merger policies. Common economic analysis leads both authorities to subject remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers to close scrutiny. Vertical mergers account for less than 10%, and potential competition matters for around 5%, of in-depth merger investigations in both jurisdictions, while purely conglomerate mergers are extremely rare or non-existent. The share of collusion investigations falls over time in both jurisdictions. However, the US relies on collusion theory more than three times as often as the EU, where over 80% of the horizontal cases address dominance. Across both regimes, roughly one eighth of all recent horizontal investigations have been analysed as non-dominance unilateral-effects cases. Only minor differences in the average probability of a merger being challenged are observed when controlling for market share. The 2004 EU reforms seem to be leading towards at least some convergence of enforcement policy.
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