| 1. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Privatization and quality : evidence from elderly care in Sweden
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Health Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-6296 .- 1879-1646. ; 49, s. 109-119
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mortality rates – an important and not easily contractible quality dimension – using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition significantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates.
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| 2. |
- Bergman, Mats A., 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging
- 2020
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Ingår i: Review of Industrial Organization. - : Springer. - 0889-938X .- 1573-7160. ; 56:1, s. 107-130
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We evaluate whether an econometric technique that is used in the spatial econometrics and network effects literature can be adopted as a test for collusive bidding in public procurement auctions. The proposed method is applied to the Swedish asphalt cartel that was discovered in 2001. Our dataset covers the period 1995–2009, which makes it possible to test for conditional independence between complementary cartel bids before and after 2001. Our estimates show a significant positive correlation between complementary cartel bids during the cartel period, whereas a non-significant correlation is shown during the later period. The variance of the parameter estimate of interest also differs between the periods, which suggests a structural change in bidding behavior among cartel members between the two periods.
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| 3. |
- Bergman, Mats A., et al.
(författare)
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Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public procurement
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management. - Oxford : Elsevier. - 1478-4092 .- 1873-6505. ; 19:2, s. 73-83
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The EU procurement directives stipulate that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the bidder with the economically most advantageous tender; the latter requiring that a scoring rule be specified. We provide a simple theoretical framework, based on standard microeconomic theory, for tender evaluation (scoring and weighing) and discuss the pros and cons of methods such as highest quality (beauty contest), lowest price and price-and-quality-based evaluations. We argue that the most common method, price-to-quality scoring, is inappropriate for several reasons. It is non-transparent, making accurate representation of the procurer's preferences difficult. It is often open to strategic manipulation, due to dependence on irrelevant alternatives, and it tends to impose particular and unjustified non-linearity in bid prices. The alternative quality-to-price scoring method, where money values are assigned to different quality levels, is a better alternative. However, when the cost of quality is relatively well-known and several providers can offer optimal quality lowest price is the preferable award criteria, while beauty contests may be preferred when purchasing budgets are inflexible.
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| 4. |
- Lundberg, Sofia, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
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Tendering design when price and quality is uncertain
- 2017
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Ingår i: International Journal of Public Sector Management. - : Emerald Group Publishing Limited. - 0951-3558 .- 1758-6666. ; 30:4, s. 310-327
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze how local and central authorities choose between lowest price and more complex scoring rules when they design supplier-selection mechanisms for public procurements. Five hypotheses are tested: a high level of cost uncertainty and highly non-verifiable quality makes the use of the lowest-price supplier-selection method less likely. Organizational habits and transaction-cost considerations influence the choice of mechanism. Strong quality concerns make complex rules more likely.Design/methodology/approach – The analysis departures from normative theory (rational choice) and is based on the regression analysis and survey data comprising a gross sample of 40 contracting authorities and detailed information about 651 procurements.Findings – More complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality. Authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partly driven by local habits and institutional inertia.Practical implications – The authors argue that, from a normative point of view, lowest price is an adequate method when the degree of uncertainty is low, for example, because the procured products are standardized and since quality can be verified. When there is significant cost uncertainty, it is better to use the so-called economically most advantageous tender (EMAT) method. (Preferably this should be done by assigning monetary values to different quality levels.) If there is significant uncertainty concerning delivered quality, the contracting authority should retain a degree of discretion, so as to be able to reward good-quality performance in observable but non-verifiable quality dimensions; options to extend the contract and subjective assessments of quality are two possibilities. The main findings are that EMAT and more complex scoring rules are used more often when the contracting authorities report that they experience substantial uncertainty concerning delivered quality and actual costs and that these factors tend to decrease the weight given to price, in line with the predictions. However, the authors also find that this result is mainly driven by variations between authorities, rather than by between-products variation for the same authority. This is from a training of professionals and regulation perspective of policy relevance.Social implications – Contract allocation based on habits rather than rational ground could implicate the waste of resources (tax payers money) as it adventures the matching of the preferences of the public sector (the objective, subject matter, of the procurement) and what the potential supplier offers in its tender.Originality/value – Although the principles for supplier selection are regulated by law they give the contracting authority substantial freedom in designing the scoring rule and in choosing what quality criteria to use. The tension between different objectives and the more general question whether the choices made by authorities reflect rational decision making or institutional inertia together motivate the current study. While the design of the supplier-selection mechanism is an important consideration in procurement practice, it has attracted relatively little attention from the academic community.
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| 5. |
- Bergman, Mats, 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Public Procurement and Non-contractible Quality : Evidence from Elderly Care
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Many quality dimensions are hard to contract upon and are at risk of degradation when the service is procured rather than produced in-house. On the other hand, procurement may foster performance-improving innovation. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden for the 1990-2009 period, including survival rates, our measure of non-contractible quality, and indicators of subjectively perceived quality of service. We estimate the effects of municipalities’ decision to procure rather than produce in-house on non-contractible quality using a difference-in-difference approach and controlling for a number of other potential determinants. The results indicate that procurement significantly increases non-contractible quality as measured by survival rate, reduces the cost per resident but does not affect subjectively perceived quality.
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| 6. |
- Bergman, Mats, 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Sourcing for government goods and services : theory and evidence from Swedish cities and municipalities
- 2013
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Ingår i: Charting a course in public procurement innovation and knowledge sharing. - Boca Raton : PrAcademics Press. - 096688647X - 9780966886474
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Departing from a simple normative theory for the choice between lowest price, highest quality (beauty contest) and more complex scoring rules, we empirically investigate the behavior of cities and authorities. We survey a gross sample of 40 procuring entities about perceived key characteristics of products bought in 650 public procurements and collect data on award methods for these procurements. We compare actual scoring rules against the theoretical norms and analyze what product characteristics make deviation from the norm more or less likely. In addition, a control group of 100 authorities was surveyed about similar but hypothetical procurements. We find that more complex scoring rules are used more often when framework agreements are procured and less so when the procuring authority reports that they experience significant uncertainty about the delivered quality. Low weight given to price in the bid award process is associated with low perceived uncertainty concerning delivered quality.
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| 7. |
- Bergman, Mats, 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Tendering Design when Price and Quality Is Uncertain : Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Departing from a simple normative theory for the choice between lowest price, highest quality (beauty contest) and more complex scoring rules, we empirically investigate the behavior of local and central authorities. We survey a gross sample of 40 contracting entities about perceived key characteristics of products bought in 651 public procurements and collect data on supplier selection methods for these procurements. We compare actual scoring rules with theoretical norms and analyze what product characteristics make deviation from the norm more or less likely. In addition, a control group of 275 authorities was surveyed about similar but hypothetical procurements. We find that more complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality, in accordance with our hypotheses. However, authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partially driven by local habits or institutional inertia.
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