| 1. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
- 2014
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
- 2021
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Stable Maximum Matchings
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In Sweden, asylum seekers are either deported or granted a residence permit. Refugee families with a residence permit are assigned to the different local municipalities. Since almost all accommodation options are exhausted in Sweden, households in some municipalities are asked to state their willingness to accommodate refugee families. In line with the European NGO “Refugees Welcome”, a refugee family and a landlord (household) are mutually acceptable if they have a language in common and if the number of offered beds of the household exceeds the number of beds needed by the refugee family. This paper proposes an algorithm that finds a maximum matching (filling the maximal number of beds) which in addition is stable.
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| 4. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Dynamic Refugee Matching
- 2018
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Asylum seekers are often assigned to a locality in their host country directly upon arrival based on some type of uninformed dynamic matching system which does not take the background of the asylum seekers into consideration. This paper proposes an informed, intuitive, easy-to-implement and computationally efficient dynamic mechanism for matching asylum seekers to localities. This mechanism can be adopted in any dynamic refugee matching problem given locality-specific quotas and that asylum seekers can be classified into specific types. We demonstrate that any matching selected by the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient and that envy between localities is bounded by a single asylum seeker. Via simulation, we evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism in settings that resemble the US and the Swedish situations, and show that our mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms even in presence of severe misclassification error in the estimation of asylum seeker types.
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| 5. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- 2018
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show that if pairwise (or some) exchanges of objects are allowed, then all exchanges (in any possible manner) must be feasible. Furthermore, whenever any agent exchanges his object, he pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment which is identical for all agents) independently of which object he consumes. Gale's top trading cycles algorithm finds the final allocation using the agents' valuations adjusted with the fixed tax. Our mechanisms are in stark contrast to Clarke-Groves taxation schemes or the max-med schemes proposed by Sprumont (2013).
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| 6. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices
- 2020
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. The focus is on price mechanisms, i.e., mappings of preference profiles to price equilibria, that are strategy-proof and satisfy an individual rationality condition. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price vector. The result is not true in full preference domain. Instead, we identify a smaller domain, that contains almost all profiles, where the result holds.
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| 7. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets
- 2018
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A time bank is a group of individuals and/or organizations in a local community that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of banking, e.g., high overhead costs for record keeping and difficulties to identify feasible trades. This paper demonstrates that these problems can be solved by organizing time banks as a centralized matching market and, more specifically, by organizing trades based on a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and time-balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the members of the time bank (and those allocations are efficient). Such a mechanism does not exist on the general preference domain but on a smaller yet natural domain where agents classify services as unacceptable and acceptable (and for those services agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs). On the general preference domain, it is demonstrated that the proposed mechanism at least can prevent some groups of agents from manipulating the mechanism without dispensing individual rationality, efficiency, or time-balance.
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| 8. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach
- 2015
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one that he currently is possessing, or continue renting the house he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants. We also argue that the theoretical model represents an extension and an improvement of the U.K. Housing Act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer the ownership of the houses to the existing tenants.
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| 9. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach
- 2014
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper explores the situation when tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in but can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, the selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains "almost all" preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is also weakly preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process that finds the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.
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