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Träfflista för sökning "AMNE:(SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics) ;srt2:(2010-2011);mspu:(article);pers:(Sutter Matthias 1968)"

Sökning: AMNE:(SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics) > (2010-2011) > Tidskriftsartikel > Sutter Matthias 1968

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  • Dulleck, U., et al. (författare)
  • The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
  • 2011
  • Ingår i: American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282. ; 101:2, s. 526-555
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
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  • Sutter, Matthias, 1968, et al. (författare)
  • Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
  • 2010
  • Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - 0034-6527. ; 77:4, s. 1540-1566
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a significantly positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to the same exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, although punishment is even more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models.
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