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Träfflista för sökning "AMNE:(SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics) ;pers:(Sutter Matthias 1968)"

Sökning: AMNE:(SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics) > Sutter Matthias 1968

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1.
  • Balafoutas, L., et al. (författare)
  • Revealed distributional preferences: Individuals vs. teams
  • 2014
  • Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - 0167-2681. ; 108, s. 319-338
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We compare experimentally the revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams in allocation tasks. We find that teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality while the benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision makers. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that while a substantial fraction of individuals is classified as inequality averse, this type disappears completely in teams. Spiteful types are markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, by far more teams than individuals are classified as efficiency lovers. © 2013 The Authors.
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3.
  • Kocher, Martin G., et al. (författare)
  • Other-regarding preferences and management styles
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - 0167-2681. ; 88, s. 109-132
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether and to what extent other-regarding preferences (efficiency, inequality aversion and maximin concerns) of team managers influence their management style in choice under risk. We find that managers who prefer efficiency are more likely to exercise an autocratic management style by ignoring preferences of their team members. Equality concerns have no significant impact on management styles. Elected managers have a higher propensity than exogenously assigned managers to use a democratic management style by reaching team consensus. We also find that male managers employ a democratic style more often than women.
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4.
  • Huber, Jürgen, et al. (författare)
  • Is more information always better? Experimental financial markets with cumulative information
  • 2008
  • Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - 0167-2681. ; 65:1, s. 86-104
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We study the value of information in financial markets by asking whether having more information always leads to higher returns. We address this question in an experiment where information about an asset's intrinsic value is cumulatively distributed among traders. We find that only the very best informed traders (i.e., insiders) significantly outperform less informed traders. However, there is a wide range of information levels (from zero information to above average information levels) where additional information does not yield higher returns. The latter result implies that the value of additional information need not be strictly positive.
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6.
  • Balafoutas, L., et al. (författare)
  • Affirmative action policies promote women and do not harm efficiency in the lab
  • 2012
  • Ingår i: Science. - 0036-8075. ; 335:6068, s. 579-582
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Gender differences in choosing to enter competitions are one source of unequal labor market outcomes concerning wages and promotions. Given that studying the effects of policy interventions to support women is difficult with field data because of measurement problems and potential lack of control, we evaluated, in a set of controlled laboratory experiments, four interventions: quotas, where one of two winners of a competition must be female; two variants of preferential treatment, where a fixed increment is added to women’s performance; and repetition of the competition, where a second competition takes place if no woman is among the winners. Compared with no intervention, all interventions encourage women to enter competitions more often, and performance is at least equally good, both during and after the competition.
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7.
  • Balafoutas, L., et al. (författare)
  • Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: European Economic Review. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 60, s. 32-51
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We study a fundamental conflict in economic decision-making, the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives, in a new experimental game that nests a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. In a 2×2 design, we let subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal endowments are either task-determined or random. We find that earned endowments lead to less support for redistribution and less cooperation. Subjects' voting is influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, in addition to self-interest. Cooperation rates respond rather continuously to incentives.
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8.
  • Balafoutas, Loukas, et al. (författare)
  • Gender, Competition and the Efficiency of Policy Intervention
  • 2010
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend.
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9.
  • Balafoutas, L., et al. (författare)
  • Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a natural experiment
  • 2012
  • Ingår i: Kyklos. - 1467-6435. ; 65:4, s. 425-441
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare reducing.
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10.
  • Balafoutas, L., et al. (författare)
  • What drives taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: The Review of Economic Studies. - 0034-6527. ; 80:3, s. 876-891
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behaviour by sellers. This article presents a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. We find that passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on significantly longer detours, while lack of information on the local tariff system increases the likelihood of manipulated bills by about fifteen percentage points. Passengers' perceived income seems to have no effect on fraud.
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