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| 2. |
- Balafoutas, Loukas, et al.
(författare)
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Gender, Competition and the Efficiency of Policy Intervention
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
- Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend.
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| 3. |
- Beck, Adrian, et al.
(författare)
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Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experiment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
- We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of proper promises.
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| 4. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968-, et al.
(författare)
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Household Decision Making in Rural China: Using Experiments to Estimate the Influences of Spouses
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
- Many economic decisions are made jointly within households. This raises the question about spouses’ relative influence on joint decisions and the determinants of relative influence. Using a controlled experiment (on inter-temporal choice), we let each spouse first make individual decisions and then make joint decisions with the other spouse. We use a random parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions. In general, husbands have a stronger influence than wives. However, in richer households and when the wife is older than the husband, we find a significantly stronger influence of the wife on joint decisions.
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| 5. |
- He, Haoran, 1981-, et al.
(författare)
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Group Decision Making Under Risk: An experiment with student couples
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
- In an experiment, we study risk-taking of cohabitating student couples, finding that couples’ decisions are closer to risk-neutrality than single partners’ decisions. This finding is similar to earlier experiments with randomly assigned groups, corroborating external validity of earlier results.
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| 6. |
- Kocker, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
- Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.
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| 7. |
- Sutter, Matthias, 1968-, et al.
(författare)
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Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
- We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in oneshot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their firstand second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
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