| 1. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
-
Should we tax or let firms trade emissions? An experimental analysis with policy implications for developing countries
- 2011
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we use laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions derived by Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) about the effects of the interaction between technology adoption and incomplete enforcement. They show that under Tradable Emissions Permits (TEPs), and in contrast to taxes, the fall in permit price produced by adoption of environmentally friendly technologies reduces the benefits of violating the environmental regulation at the margin and leads firms to improve their compliance behavior. Moreover, when TEPs are used, the regulator can speed up the diffusion of new technologies since the benefits from adopting the new technology increase with the enforcement stringency. Our experimental results confirm these theoretical predictions. While the aggregate emissions do not statistically differ between the two policy instruments, the fraction of firms violating the regulation and the aggregate extent of violation are lower under TEPs than under emission taxes regardless of the monitoring probability. Hence, in contrast to previous studies, our results indicate that TEPs would appear to be a feasible policy alternative in weak regulatory contexts.
|
|
| 2. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
-
Why Do Environmental Taxes Work Better in Developed Countries?
- 2011
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We compare of the performance of emission taxes between Colombia and Sweden in an experimental setting where subjects are regulated through environmental taxes and had to decide on emission levels, compliance behavior, and adoption of an environmentally friendly technology. Our design allows us to analyze the role of variations in the stringency of the policy enforcement by regulatory agencies in two different cultural contexts. In line with previous literature that emphasizes the role of social norms and intrinsic motivations explaining compliance behavior, we find that actual emissions and tax underreporting are lower than predicted by traditional models that are solely based on self-interested preferences. However, we find that for an equivalent monitoring stringency, there are no statistically significant differences in emission levels and compliance behavior between Colombian and Swedish subjects. This is to say that despite the positive effect of social norms enhancing compliance, a more stringent enforcement remains as an important mechanism to induce firms to comply with the regulation.
|
|
| 3. |
- Guzmán, Andrea, et al.
(författare)
-
Social Information and Charitable Giving: An artefactual field experiment with young children and adolescents
- 2013
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A growing literature in economics examines the development of preferences among children and adolescents. This paper combines a repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides participants with information about the average behavior of others or not. Collecting data on 384 children aged 5-17, we find that sensitivity to social information is present already in early life and that information about others’ donations can reduce, but primarily increases donations.
|
|
| 4. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Conditional Cooperation and Disclosure in Developing Countries
- 2012
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Understanding the motivations behind people’s voluntary contributions to public goods is crucial for the broader issues of economic and social development. By using the experimental design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), we investigate the distribution of contribution types in two developing countries with very high collectivism rating – Colombia and Vietnam – and compare our findings with those previously found in developed countries. We also investigate the effect of introducing disclosure of contribution on the distribution of contribution types and on the contribution itself. Overall, our experiments show that the distribution of contribution types remains unaffected by the disclosure of contributions and, on average, is similar both in the two countries and when compared with previous findings with the exception of proportion of free-riders.
|
|
| 5. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Conditional Cooperation and Social Group - Experimental results from Colombia
- 2009
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In contrast to previous studies on cross-group comparisons of conditional cooperation, this study keeps cross- and within-country dimensions constant. The results reveal significantly different cooperation behavior between social groups in the same location.
|
|
| 6. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Does disclosure crowd out cooperation?
- 2010
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper investigates whether disclosure crowds out pro-social behavior using a public goods experiment. In a between-subject design, we investigate different degrees of disclosure. We find a small positive but insignificant effect of disclosure treatments on contributions to the public good. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with crowding theory.
|
|
| 7. |
- Villegas Palacio, Clara, 1974, et al.
(författare)
-
Taxes, Permits and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance
- 2009
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the effects of the choice between price-based and quantity-based emission regulations on compliance incentives and social welfare in the presence of incomplete enforcement and technology adoption. We show that in contrast to taxes, the extent of violations under tradable emission permits (TEPs) decreases with the rate of technology adoption. However, in terms of welfare, the ranking of the instruments is not so straightforward: taxes induce lower emission damages while TEPs induce lower abatement, investment, and expected enforcement costs. Thereby, the overall ranking depends on the extent to which these effects offset each other.
|
|
