| 1. |
- Furtner, Nadja C., et al.
(författare)
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Gender and cooperative preferences on five continents
- 2016
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men.
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| 2. |
- Guzmán, Andrea, et al.
(författare)
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Social Information and Charitable Giving: An artefactual field experiment with young children and adolescents
- 2013
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A growing literature in economics examines the development of preferences among children and adolescents. This paper combines a repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides participants with information about the average behavior of others or not. Collecting data on 384 children aged 5-17, we find that sensitivity to social information is present already in early life and that information about others’ donations can reduce, but primarily increases donations.
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| 3. |
- Hennlock, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Prices versus Standards and Firm Behavior: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment
- 2017
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We conduct an artefactual field experiment in which 164 managers and senior advisors recruited from Swedish industry were presented with a task of maximizing net revenue from abatement investments under three different but equally stringent environmental policy regimes. We find that investment decisions are strongly influenced by type of policy instrument. Economic instruments and performance standards cause different attentional and judgment biases that are inconsistent with standard economic theory. Inconsistencies are larger with economic policy instruments (tax and subsidy) than with performance standards even though subjects’ attention to cost minimization was greater with economic instruments than under performance standards.
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| 4. |
- Knutsson, Mikael, et al.
(författare)
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Do people avoid opportunities to donate? A natural field experiment on recycling and charitable giving
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We use a natural field experiment to investigate the hypothesis that generosity is partly involuntary, by examining whether individuals tend to avoid opportunities to act generously. In Sweden, new recycling machines for bottles and cans with an option of donating the returned deposit to charity were gradually introduced in one of the largest store chains. We find a substantial decline in recycling the month these new machines were introduced and a further decline in the following months. These results indicate that individuals avoid opportunities to act generously and corroborate findings from both lab and field studies supporting the claim that generous behavior is partly involuntary.
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| 5. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control. As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models.
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| 6. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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The role of beliefs, trust, and risk in contributions to a public good
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper experimentally investigates the role of beliefs, trust, and risk in shaping cooperative behavior. By applying incentivized elicitation methods to measure these concepts, we find that beliefs about others’ behavior and trust are positively associated with cooperation in a public goods game. However, even though contributing unconditionally to a public good resembles a situation of making decisions under risk, elicited risk preferences do not seem to explain cooperation in a systematic way.
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| 7. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
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Conditional Cooperation and Social Group - Experimental results from Colombia
- 2009
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In contrast to previous studies on cross-group comparisons of conditional cooperation, this study keeps cross- and within-country dimensions constant. The results reveal significantly different cooperation behavior between social groups in the same location.
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| 8. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
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Conditional Cooperation: Evidence for the Role of Self-Control
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- When facing the opportunity to allocate resources between oneself and others, individuals may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and preferences to act pro-socially. We explore the domain of conditional cooperation, and we test the hypothesis that increased expectations about others’ average contribution increases own contributions to public goods more when self-control is high than when it is low. We pair a subtle framing technique with a public goods experiment. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conditionally cooperative behavior is stronger (i.e., less imperfect) when expectations of high contributions are accompanied by high levels of self-control.
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| 9. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
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Reconciling Pro-Social vs. Selfish Behavior - Evidence for the Role of Self-Control
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We test the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between short-term temptation to be selfish and better judgment to act pro-socially. Using a dictator game and a public goods game, we manipulated the likelihood that individuals identified self-control conflict, and we measured their trait ability to implement self-control strategies. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that trait self-control exhibits a positive and significant correlation with pro-social behavior in the treatment that raises likelihood of conflict identification, but not in the treatment that reduces likelihood of conflict identification.
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| 10. |
- Myrseth, Kristian Ove R., et al.
(författare)
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Intuitive cooperation refuted: Commentary on Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014)
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We show that Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014)—who argue that cooperation is intuitive—provide an incorrect interpretation of their own data. They make the mistake of inferring intuition from relative decision times alone, without taking into account absolute decision times. We re-examine their data and find that the vast majority of their responses are slow, exceeding four seconds, even in time-pressure treatments intended to promote intuitive responses. Further, a plot of the average cooperation rates by decision time presents no clear relationship between decision time and cooperation. However, among the few decisions that were relatively fast (less than four seconds), there appears to be a positive—not negative—correlation between decision time and cooperation. We conclude that the data presented by Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014) fail to provide evidence for the hypothesis that cooperation is intuitive. If anything, their data indicate the opposite.
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