| 1. |
|
|
| 2. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
-
The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 46:2, s. 326-354
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
|
|
| 3. |
- Buijsman, Stefan, 1995-
(författare)
-
Learning the Natural Numbers as a Child
- 2019
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - : Wiley. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 53:1, s. 3-22
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How do we get out knowledge of the natural numbers? Various philosophical accounts exist, but there has been comparatively little attention to psychological data on how the learning process actually takes place. I work through the psychological literature on number acquisition with the aim of characterising the acquisition stages in formal terms. In doing so, I argue that we need a combination of current neologicist accounts and accounts such as that of Parsons. In particular, I argue that we learn the initial segment of the natural numbers on the basis of the Fregean definitions, but do not learn the natural number structure as a whole on the basis of Hume's principle. Therefore, we need to account for some of the consistency of our number concepts with the Dedekind‐Peano axioms in other terms.
|
|
| 4. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-
(författare)
-
'Good' in Terms of 'Better'
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - : Wiley. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 50:1, s. 213-223
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There have been many attempts to define the monadic value properties of intrinsic or final goodness and badness in terms of the dyadic betterness relation. By reducing the number of primitive concepts, such definitions would, if possible, be desirable for reasons of theoretical simplicity. Johan Gustafsson has recently argued, however, that no such definitions can succeed.1 I shall suggest definitions that avoid Gustafsson's objections, and have the further advantage of being more generally applicable than earlier proposals.
|
|
| 5. |
|
|
| 6. |
- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(författare)
-
Should Moral Intuitionism Go Social?
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068.
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult normative and meta-normative questions for theorists of all stripes.
|
|
| 7. |
- Eyal, Nir, et al.
(författare)
-
Input and output in distributive theory
- 2021
-
Ingår i: Nous. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068.
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Distributive theories evaluate distributions of goods based on candidate recipients’ characteristics, e.g. how well off candidates are, how deserving they are, and whether they fare below sufficiency. But such characteristics vary across possible worlds, so distributive theories may differ in terms of the world which for them settles candidates’ characteristics. This paper examines how distributive theories differ in terms of whether candidate recipients’ relevant characteristics are grounded in the possible world that would take place if the distributor does not intervene (call it the “input” world) or if they are grounded in each possible world that the distributor can bring about through different decisions (call each an “output” world). We illustrate the importance of this distinction in relation to one distributive theory, prioritarianism. As we show, both input and output versions of prioritarianism are plausible interpretations of the literature, and there are good reasons to take input prioritarianism seriously. Ultimately, however, we argue that input prioritarianism should be rejected.
|
|
| 8. |
- Fogal, Daniel, et al.
(författare)
-
Explaining Normative Reasons
- 2023
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 57:1, s. 51-80
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.
|
|
| 9. |
|
|
| 10. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979
(författare)
-
A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Nous. - : Wiley. - 0029-4624. ; 54:4, s. 891-913
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions should hold if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable: First, if rational people may differ as to which option is the most preferred in an option set, the offered freedom of choice has some intrinsic value. Second, if an option set is expanded with an option that must be less preferred than the already available options by any rational person, the intrinsic value of the offered freedom of choice does not increase. Third, if an option set is expanded, the intrinsic value of the offered freedom of choice does not decrease. Fourth, if an option set has only one option, it does not offer any intrinsically good freedom of choice. And, fifth, the relation ‘at least as good freedom of choice as’ is transitive. The trouble is that there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable. © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
|
|
