| 1. |
- Baum, Christopher F., et al.
(författare)
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Innovation by start-up firms : The role of the board of directors for knowledge spillovers
- 2022
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Ingår i: Research Policy. - : Elsevier BV. - 0048-7333 .- 1873-7625. ; 51:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper investigates whether board directors interlocked with or employed by innovative firms affect startup firms' propensity to be innovators themselves. Drawing upon a sample of more than 50,000 Swedish start-up firms, we find that board connections to incumbent innovators have a causal impact on the new firms' probability to apply for patents. The results are robust when controlling for industry, geography, firm age, as well as spillovers through worker and managerial mobility, external knowledge sourcing through patent disclosure, access to venture capital and board attributes.
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| 2. |
- Ensthaler, Ludwig, et al.
(författare)
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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
- 2014
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Ingår i: Research Policy. - : Elsevier. - 0048-7333 .- 1873-7625. ; 43:1, s. 179-189
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability and limitations. Moreover, we highlight connections to recent advances in computer science.
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| 3. |
- Giebe, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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How to allocate R&D (and other) subsidies : an experimentally tested policy recommendation
- 2006
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Ingår i: Research Policy. - : Elsevier. - 0048-7333 .- 1873-7625. ; 35:9, s. 1261-1272
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper evaluates the typically applied rules for awarding R&D subsidies. We identify two sources of inefficiency: the selection based on a ranking of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the failure to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and use information about the necessary funding. In order to correct these inefficiencies we propose mechanisms that include some form of an auction in which applicants bid for subsidies. Our proposals are tested in a simulation and in controlled lab experiments. The results suggest that adopting our proposals may considerably improve the allocation.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Squazzoni, Flaminio, et al.
(författare)
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Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study
- 2013
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Ingår i: Research Policy. - : Elsevier BV. - 0048-7333 .- 1873-7625. ; 42:1, s. 287-294
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms. Discovering its true dynamics and exploring adjustments which improve the commitment of everyone involved could benefit scientific development for all disciplines and consequently increase innovation in the economy and the society. We have reported the results of an innovative experiment developed to model peer review. We demonstrate that offering material rewards to referees tends to decrease the quality and efficiency of the reviewing process. Our findings help to discuss the viability of different options of incentive provision, supporting the idea that journal editors and responsible of research funding agencies should be extremely careful in offering material incentives on reviewing, since these might undermine moral motives which guide referees’ behavior.
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