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- Andersson, Claes, 1973
(författare)
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Splitting the replicator: generalized Darwinism and the place of culture in Nature
- 2011
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 80:3, s. 657-669
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The concept of Replication has been turned around, moved about and hammered upon in search for a good fit in the puzzle of Generalized Darwinism for a long time. The present paper represents a different take on the formulation of a Generalized Darwinism and on Replication. Replication in evolutionary biology is argued to combine two functions: (i) the production of propositions (Synthesis) and (ii) the retention of propositions over time (Memory). By insisting on universally grouping these two functions together the Replicator–Interactor (RI) framework is here argued to suffer from a fundamental ontological mismatch that no amount of bending and stretching of the concept can avoid. When we allow different packaging of Interaction, Synthesis and Memory (ISM) for different systems, we produce much less empirical friction. Replication then emerges as an important special case, but where replication is not the right model, the ISM model brings a range of issues into the open that remain hidden from an RI viewpoint. Also, when we reserve replication for the cases where it really fits we retain the strong theoretical power and empirical relevance by which it gained its fame in evolutionary biology.
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| 2. |
- Bernard, Mark, et al.
(författare)
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The subgroup problem : When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 91, s. 122-130
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a common pool resource game protocol with voting we examine experimentally how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated. Our results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions. When players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum. When players extract resources individually, there is substantial overextraction. When players vote in subgroups, there is initially less overextraction but it increases over time. This suggests that in order for binding voting to overcome the tragedy of the commons in social dilemmas, it should ideally affect the group as a whole.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Persson, Emil
(författare)
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Testing the impact of frustration and anger when responsibility is low
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 145, s. 435-448
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Anger is a powerful emotion and it is important to understand its role in human interaction. Angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others, and this has strategic consequences. Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; BDS) develop a formal framework where frustration and anger affect interaction and shape economic outcomes. This paper presents an experiment designed to test predictions based on versions of the theory that involve no or low responsibility of the punished person. In this specific context, I find only limited, support for the theory: While unfulfilled expectations about material pay-offs generate negative emotions in subjects (which is in line with BDS' conceptualization of frustration), these emotions do not affect subjects' behavior in the experiment. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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