| 1. |
- Garz, Marcel, et al.
(författare)
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Cartels in the European Union, antitrust action, and public attention
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 186, s. 533-547
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study compiles an original dataset to investigate whether the timing of actions by the European Commission in cartel proceedings is affected by the overall news agenda. Our results indicate that certain actions are more likely to coincide with large predictable news events (e.g., the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics), the more EU firms involved in a cartel – compared to cartels with few EU companies or many non-EU firms. Studying the implications of the differential timing, we find that the occurrence of unrelated newsworthy events lowers public attention to the actions, as measured by news agency and newspaper reports, as well as relevant Google searches. These findings do not constitute conclusive evidence of favoritism, that the Commission favors domestic companies by reducing the negative publicity associated with the proceedings. However, even a suspicion of a subtle form of protectionism undermines the Commission's role as an independent supranational regulator.
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| 2. |
- Garz, Marcel, et al.
(författare)
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Cautionary tales : Celebrities, the news media, and participation in tax amnesties
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 155, s. 288-300
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study investigates whether press coverage on celebrities with tax issues affects the behavior of other tax payers. We compile an original data set for Germany, including regional information on the amount of tax payers using amnesty regulations to voluntarily disclose taxes they have evaded. The data set also includes counts of news reports published by 6 national and 54 local newspapers that address celebrity tax evaders who were publicly tried between January 2010 and June 2016. We find a strong correlation between the amount of self-denunciations and the news coverage. To identify the causal effect, we use exogenous variation in the reporting, resulting from disasters and terrorist attacks that coincide with the celebrity trials. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that an increase in news coverage by the amount of an average trial raises participation in the tax amnesty program by approximately 22.5%. This finding helps to better understand the effectiveness of tax amnesties, and it illustrates the economic implications of publicly trying famous personalities.
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| 3. |
- Garz, Marcel, et al.
(författare)
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Partisan selective engagement : Evidence from Facebook
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 177, s. 91-108
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study investigates the effects of variation in “congeniality” of news on Facebook user engagement (likes, shares, and comments). We compile an original data set of Facebook posts by 84 German news outlets on politicians that were investigated for criminal offenses from January 2012 to June 2017. We also construct an index of each outlet's media slant by comparing the language of the outlet with that of the main political parties, which allows us to measure the congeniality of the posts. We find that user engagement with congenial posts is higher than with uncongenial ones, especially in terms of likes. The within-outlet, within-topic design allows us to infer that the greater engagement with congenial news is likely driven by psychological and social factors, rather than a desire for accurate or otherwise instrumental information.
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| 4. |
- Hagen, Johannes, 1986-, et al.
(författare)
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Financial fraud and individual investment behavior
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 203, s. 593-626
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We show that, after the revelation of financial fraud in a major pension fund manager, two-thirds of affected investors fail to divest. Inert investors are on average younger, of lower SES and more influenced by default options. The majority of those who divest move their money to the only state-run option on the fund menu. The revelation of fraud also induces a small movement of investors from non-fraudulent private investment funds to the state alternative. We further show that most fraud victims end up in underperforming high-fee funds through their prior affiliation with a subscription-based financial advisor. Our analysis is based on the remarkable events surrounding the expulsion of Allra from the Swedish Premium Pension, and administrative, individual-level data on mutual fund choices and background characteristics. Our results illustrate that fraudulent fund man-agers may exploit widespread consumer biases in choice-oriented pension plans, and that information interventions by the government are important but far from fully effective in nudging victimized investors to take the right action. Pension plans may be characterized by investor inertia even under extreme circumstances such as fraud.
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| 5. |
- Holm, Jerker, et al.
(författare)
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Intra-generational trust - A semi-experimental study of trust among different generations
- 2005
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 58:3, s. 403-419
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a public database in Sweden we obtained a subject pool consisting of one group of 20 years old and another group exactly 50 years older. The groups participated in a mail-based trust game, in which the young cohort exhibited more trust than the older one. Subjects significantly preferred to place trust in co-players of their own cohort and of the female sex. When amounts sent and proportions returned in the mail-based game are compared with other trust games conducted in standard laboratory environments, it is found that the mail-based game does not seem to generate extreme distributions. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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