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- Akay, Alpaslan, 1975, et al.
(författare)
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Offshoring and well-being of workers
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 200, s. 388-407
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using long panels of industry-specific offshoring information and subjectively reported well-being datasets mainly from Germany, which is also supported by datasets from the UK and Australia, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between offshoring and workers' subjective well-being in the source country. We employ panel data fixed-effects models with time-variant personality measures and industry-specific measures to alleviate the bias stemming from the non-random sorting of individuals in industries. Our findings suggest that offshoring negatively relates to workers' subjective well-being. The result is unexceptionally consistent across Germany, the UK, and Australia, and the effect is larger in business services and among high-skilled workers. We extensively discuss how contextual "fear-factors" prevailing in the source countries interact with the angst generated by the negative framing of offshoring. To single out such angst, we first show that objective and subjective job security concerns, job characteristics, and labor market conditions only marginally relate to the well-being effect of offshoring. Then, we investigate how the effect of offshoring on well-being is amplified by a larger set of contextual factors pertaining to temporary economic shocks, negative narratives about offshoring during electoral cycles, partisan political preferences, and high immigration rates. Finally, we show that a recent skill upgrade significantly diminishes the negative effect of offshoring on well-being.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )
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| 2. |
- Bernard, Mark, et al.
(författare)
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The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common resource pool overcome the tragedy of the commons?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 91, s. 122-130
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a common pool resource game protocol with voting we examine experimentally how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated. Our results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions. When players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum. When players extract resources individually, there is substantial overextraction. When players vote in subgroups, there is initially less overextraction but it increases over time. This suggests that in order for binding voting to overcome the tragedy of the commons in social dilemmas, it should ideally affect the group as a whole.
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| 3. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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The devil is in the details : Incorrect intuitions in optimal search
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 75:2, s. 338-347
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the classic Secretary Problem it has been established that people tend to search somewhat less than is optimal, and a number of explanations have been suggested. Here we propose a new explanation, the Similar-But-Incorrect Intuitions Hypothesis, which says that suboptimal search behavior is to be expected because optimal strategies vary disproportionately with subtle details of the search problem setup, whereas people seem to entertain general intuitions about optimal search. We find support for this hypothesis in experiments on a new search problem, the Explore-and-Collect Problem, where the player collects utility from an option every time it is tried and options can be recalled. Although the optimal search effort in this problem is much smaller than for the Secretary Problem, people tend to search only marginally less. This is not predicted by previous explanations for suboptimal search.
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