| 1. |
- Angelova, Vera, et al.
(författare)
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Competition and fatigue
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 198, s. 236-249
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study how subjects deal with fatigue in a sequence of tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers. We develop a model that allows us to predict the consequences of varying the severity of competition as well as the ease of recovery over time. Even in the presence of fatigue, effort should positively respond to an increase in incentives in a single tournament. A less obvious consequence is the need for strategic resting before and after that tournament. We test our theory using a chosen-effort experiment. While an increase in incentives in the second of three tournaments does lead to higher effort in that tournament, we observe only a tendency for the predicted strategic resting before and after. The increase in incentives does not yield the predicted higher total effort. When recovery is made harder, effort responds negatively as predicted. We complement our study with a real-effort task. Subjects seem to have difficulties simultaneously dealing with physical fatigue as well as the cognitive problem of allocating effort over time.
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| 2. |
- Giebe, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 81:2, s. 403-420
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal, a supervisor and an agent. The supervisor is either neutral or altruistic towards the agent, but his preferences are private information. In a model with two supervisor types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent's performance truthfully, while the altruistic type reports favorably independent of performance. Accordingly, overstated performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries.
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