| 1. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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How Much Do We Care About Absolute versus Relative Income and Consumption?
- 2005
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 56, s. 405-421
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We find, using survey-experimental methods, that most individuals are concerned with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods. The degree of concern varies in the expected direction depending on the properties of the good. However, contrary to what has been suggested in the previous literature, we find that relative consumption is also important for vacation and insurance, which are typically seen as non-positional goods. Further, absolute consumption is also found to be important for cars and housing, which are widely regarded as highly positional. © 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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| 2. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Positional preferences in time and space: Optimal income taxation with dynamic social comparisons
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 101, s. 1-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal redistributive non-linear income taxation in an OLG model, where people care about their own consumption relative to (i) other people's current consumption, (ii) own past consumption, and (iii) other people's past consumption. We show that both (i) and (iii) affect the marginal income tax structure whereas (ii) does not. We also derive conditions under which atemporal and intertemporal consumption comparisons give rise to exactly the same tax policy responses. On the basis of the available empirical estimates, comparisons with other people's current and past consumption tend to substantially increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates. Yet, such comparisons may either increase or decrease the optimal marginal capital income tax rates. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. EL AB, 1990, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW102 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
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| 3. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Self-image and valuation of moral goods: Stated versus actual willingness to pay
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 84:3, s. 879-891
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Hypothetical bias in stated-preference methods appears sometimes to be very large, and other times non-existent. This is here largely explained by a model where people derive utility from a positive self-image associated with morally commendable behavior. The results of a choice experiment are consistent with the predictions of this model: the hypothetical marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a moral good (contributions to a WWF project) is significantly higher than the corresponding real-money MWTP, whereas no hypothetical bias is seen for an amoral good (a restaurant voucher). Moreover, the evidence suggests that also the real-money MWTP for the moral good is biased upwards, in the sense that it appears to be higher within than outside the experimental context. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 4. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Trust, trust games and stated trust: Experimental evidence from rural Bangladesh
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 95, s. 286-298
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- IntroductionThere is a great deal of recent theoretical and empirical evidence that trust between people fosters co-operation andeconomic activity and is hence crucial for economic and social development (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997).Not surprisingly, the interest in measuring and explaining the determinants of trust, especially in developing countries, hastherefore increased rapidly over the last decade. Unfortunately, trust turns out to be difficult to measure. The main objectiveof this paper is to contribute to our understanding about what the main methods used – trust games and trust surveys –actually measure, based on a non-student sample in a developing country.Trust has been measured either by using attitudinal trust, most commonly framed by the question “Generally speaking,would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” as in the GeneralSocial Survey (GSS) question, or by conducting a trust game; see Wilson and Eckel (2011) for a comprehensive state-of-the-art overview of different ways of measuring trust. Trust surveys have been criticized for not implying consequences for therespondents, which is in contrast to trust games (also denoted investment games; Berg et al., 1995) where the decisionshave real monetary effects. Briefly, a trust game is a two stage game involving a “sender” and a “receiver.” The sender isgiven a certain amount of money and has to decide how much of it to send to the anonymous receiver and how much tokeep. Any positive amount sent by the sender is normally tripled before it is given to the receiver, who then decides howmuch to return to the sender. A selfish sender who anticipates that the receiver will be selfish too should send nothing tothe receiver, since he/she should realize, by using backward induction, that the receiver has no incentive to send anythingback. However, a Pareto improvement is possible if the receiver returns at least one-third of the tripled amount received.
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