| 1. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Household decision making in rural China: Using experiments to estimate the influences of spouses
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 84:2, s. 525-536
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many economic decisions are made jointly within households. Running an experiment on intertemporal choice, we investigate the relative influence of spouses on joint household decisions. We let each spouse first decide individually and then jointly with the other spouse. We propose the use of a random parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions. We find that joint choices are in between husbands' and wives' choices with respect to impatience, indicating that both spouses have an influence on joint decisions. However, we estimate that in 99% of households husbands have a stronger influence than wives.
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| 2. |
- Furtner, N. C., et al.
(författare)
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Gender and cooperative preferences
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 181, s. 39-48
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others' contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks of our original data from Germany, based on data from six countries around the world, confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, supporting the view that these are more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues in women than in men. (c) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 3. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Trust, trust games and stated trust: Experimental evidence from rural Bangladesh
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 95, s. 286-298
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- IntroductionThere is a great deal of recent theoretical and empirical evidence that trust between people fosters co-operation andeconomic activity and is hence crucial for economic and social development (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997).Not surprisingly, the interest in measuring and explaining the determinants of trust, especially in developing countries, hastherefore increased rapidly over the last decade. Unfortunately, trust turns out to be difficult to measure. The main objectiveof this paper is to contribute to our understanding about what the main methods used – trust games and trust surveys –actually measure, based on a non-student sample in a developing country.Trust has been measured either by using attitudinal trust, most commonly framed by the question “Generally speaking,would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” as in the GeneralSocial Survey (GSS) question, or by conducting a trust game; see Wilson and Eckel (2011) for a comprehensive state-of-the-art overview of different ways of measuring trust. Trust surveys have been criticized for not implying consequences for therespondents, which is in contrast to trust games (also denoted investment games; Berg et al., 1995) where the decisionshave real monetary effects. Briefly, a trust game is a two stage game involving a “sender” and a “receiver.” The sender isgiven a certain amount of money and has to decide how much of it to send to the anonymous receiver and how much tokeep. Any positive amount sent by the sender is normally tripled before it is given to the receiver, who then decides howmuch to return to the sender. A selfish sender who anticipates that the receiver will be selfish too should send nothing tothe receiver, since he/she should realize, by using backward induction, that the receiver has no incentive to send anythingback. However, a Pareto improvement is possible if the receiver returns at least one-third of the tripled amount received.
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| 4. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Social background, cooperative behavior and norm-enforcement
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - 0167-2681. ; 81:2, s. 341-354
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town. For this end, a unique data set was created, based on public goods experiments conducted in Cape Town, South Africa. Most of the differences in behavior can, however, be explained by variables accounting for social capital and social environment, such as trust or household violence.
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| 5. |
- Martinangeli, Andrea F.M., et al.
(författare)
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We, the rich: Inequality, identity and cooperation
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 178, s. 249-266
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2020 Elsevier B.V. Inequality not only generates status differentials between rich and poor individuals, it also generates status differentials between groups of different composition and income level. We organise the social structure within which groups are embedded to manipulate their composition and relative status, thus inducing weaker or stronger group identities in their members via the processes of social categorization, identification and comparison. We therefore manipulate the fundamental components of group identity rather than resorting to ad hoc identity reinforcement tasks. How strongly individuals identify with each group will ultimately determine the degree of cooperativeness within the group and the whole society. We find that the impact of inequality on social cooperativeness is not trivial: cooperation varies with the strength of the group's identity as predicted by social identity theory. In particular, high endowment homogeneous groups cooperate most and increasingly over time. Low endowment homogeneous groups display intermediate levels of cooperation. Heterogeneous groups cooperate least, a result driven by lack of cooperation on behalf of the rich. As endowment sizes and groups are exogenously allocated, we argue that our findings are a lower bound for the effects generated where endowments and groups are endogenously determined, in or outside of the laboratory.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Sutter, Matthias, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Social preferences in childhood and adolescence. A large-scale experiment to estimate primary and secondary motivations
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 146, s. 16-30
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We elicit social preferences of 883 children and teenagers, aged eight to 17 years, in an experiment. Using an econometric mixture model we estimate a subject’s primary and secondary social preference motivations. The secondary motivation indicates the motivation that becomes relevant when the primary motivation implies indifference between various choices. For girls, particularly older ones, maximin-preferences are the most frequent primary motivation, while for boys efficiency concerns are most relevant. Examining secondary motivations reveals that girls are mostly social-welfare-oriented, with strong equity concerns. Boys are also oriented towards social welfare, but are more concerned with efficiency than with equity.
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