| 1. |
- Tagesson, Torbjörn, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
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What Do Auditors Do? : Obviously they do not scrutinize the accounting and reporting
- 2011
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Ingår i: Financial Accountability and Management. - : Blackwell Publishing. - 0267-4424 .- 1468-0408. ; 27:3, s. 272-285
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Auditors and auditing firms are important actors in the process of institutionalising accounting standards. However, the formal and institutional requirements to de facto ensure professionalism and independence in the Swedish municipal sector have been strongly questioned. The aim of this paper is to investigate and explain how deviations from accounting standards are treated and reported by auditors. The results indicate deficiency in both competence and independence among the auditors. The institutional arrangements in Sweden do not seem to ensure that auditors facilitate and support the implementation of accounting standards.
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| 2. |
- Collin, Sven-Olof Yrjö, 1957-, et al.
(författare)
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Explaining municipal audit costs in Sweden : Reconsidering the political environment, the municipal organisation and the audit market
- 2017
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Ingår i: Financial Accountability and Management. - : Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Inc.. - 0267-4424 .- 1468-0408. ; 33:4, s. 391-405
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- With the purpose of explaining professional audit costs in Swedish municipalities, we hypothesised that audit costs are partly driven by various signalling and monitoring incentives in order to manage stakeholder relationships. Our model of the determinants of audit costs was tested on data from Swedish municipalities, thus extending the study of audit costs to political organisations in a Scandinavian institutional context. The test supported to some extent the traditional propositions of organisational complexity, risk and market determinants, as well as the proposition of the political environment. Our results indicate that audit costs are used to signal accountability, thereby suggesting that audit as a signal could be managed without managing professional auditors.
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