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- Ericson Wolke, Lars
(författare)
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Skeppet Vasas kanoner år 1628
- 2011
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Ingår i: Forum navale. - Stockholm : Sjöhistoriska samfundet. - 0280-6215. ; :67, s. 162-168
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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- Wedin, Lars, 1947-
(författare)
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Svenskt marinstrategiskt tänkande - en återblick med sikte på framtiden
- 2012
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Ingår i: Forum navale. - : Sjöhistoriska Samfundet. - 0280-6215. ; 68, s. 105-149
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the middle of the 19th century, the Royal Swedish Navy was in a very bad shape. However, during the years around the turn of the century, 19th to 20th, the Navy was able to acquire for its time modern ships. At the same time, naval officers laid the foundation for a Swedish naval strategic culture that, basically, was valid until the end of the Cold War. The main aspects of this culture were:Strategic defense against invasion from the sea – with a mix of offensive and defensive tactics that varied over time;Fleet in being using the archipelagos as protection;The main target was to be the enemy’s transport ships, not his main naval force;Strategic cooperation with the army and air force while, especially the army, saw the navy as a subordinate force;A vocation to defend Sea Lines of Communication that was not accepted by the Commander in Chief or by the politicians – except during the two world wars.The thinkers of the navy have been influenced from abroad, mainly: Colomb, Corbett, Castex, and to some extent Mahan. Influent naval officers have studied at US Naval War College or its French counterpart.Today, this culture is not valid. The navy has to develop a new culture where naval diplomacy, protection of Sea Lines of Communication, power projection, and cooperation with international and national actors are of prime importance. However, the classic strategic language – presence, sea control etc. – are still basically valid and should be used in the development of a new maritime strategy. In this context, the extreme jointness of Swedish Armed Forces is a problem. It is now necessary for the navy to, while still being part of the joint force, to reunite with the maritime world.
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