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Sökning: L773:0304 3878

  • Resultat 1-10 av 26
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1.
  • Lidström, Per, et al. (författare)
  • Military expenditures in developing countries: a comment on Deger and Sen
  • 1988
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - Elsevier. - 0304-3878. ; 28:1, s. 105-110
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • This note contains a criticism of an article by Deger and Sen (1983) who discuss the causes of military expenditure in less developed countries. It is argued that their utility function is unsuitably specified and that the conclusions drawn may be called into question. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the concept of a benevolent government that maximizes a single utility function is conducive to an understanding of actual decision problems in the majority of LDCs.
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2.
  • Andersson, Camilla, et al. (författare)
  • Impacts of the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia on livestock and tree holdings of rural households
  • 2011
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 94:1, s. 119-126
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We evaluated the impacts of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) on rural households' holdings of livestock and forest assets/trees. We found no indication that participation in PSNP induces households to disinvest in livestock or trees. In fact, households that participated in the program increased the number of trees planted, but there was no increase in their livestock holdings. We found no strong evidence that the PSNP protects livestock in times of shock. Shocks appear to lead households to disinvest in livestock, but not in trees. Our results suggest that there is increased forestry activity as a result of PSNP, and that improved credit access encourages households to increase their livestock holdings.
3.
  • Belissa, T., et al. (författare)
  • Liquidity constraints, informal institutions, and the adoption of weather insurance: A randomized controlled Trial in Ethiopia
  • 2019
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 140, s. 269-278
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We report the results of a drought insurance experiment in Ethiopia, and examine whether uptake of index-based insurance is enhanced if we allow farmers to pay after harvest (addressing a liquidity constraint). We also test to what extent uptake can be enhanced by promoting insurance via informal risk-sharing institutions (Iddirs), to reduce trust and information problems. The delayed payment insurance product increases uptake substantially when compared to standard insurance, from 8% to 24%, and leveraging informal institutions results in even greater uptake (43%). We also find suggestive evidence that the delayed premium product is indeed better at targeting the liquidity constrained. However, default rates associated with delayed payments are relatively high and concentrated in a small number of Iddirs – potentially compromising the economic viability of the novel product. We discuss how default rates can be reduced. © 2019 Elsevier B.V.
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4.
  • Bengtsson, Niklas (författare)
  • Efficient informal trade : Theory and experimental evidence from the Cape Town taxi market
  • 2015
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 115, s. 85-98
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Informal sectors in developing countries are often thought of as responses to rigid and cumbersome market regulations. In this paper I study informal trade as a first-best outcome. In the model I propose rigid regulations can be necessary to achieve efficiency even though they are always sidestepped. The key assumption is that the regulations define the trading parties' fall-back position in case the informal bargaining process breaks down. I set up a field experiment to test the model's mechanisms in the Cape Town market for metered taxis. Consistent with the model, I find that sidestepping the regulations increase cost efficiency (taxis take the shortest route). The price is however unaffected, suggesting informal bargaining leads to a Pareto improvement.
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5.
  • Bengtsson, Niklas (författare)
  • How responsive is body weigth to transitory income changes? Evidence from rural Tanzania
  • 2010
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 92:1, s. 53-61
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We use time-series of rainfall to estimate the response of body weight to transitory changes in household income in rural Tanzania. We find that the response of body weight to income changes is positive on average, but that the impact is highest for female children, and lower for adults. For female children, a ten-percent increase in household income implies an increase in body weight by about 0.4 kg. In contrast, the body weight of adolescents and young adults is virtually invariant to income changes.
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6.
  • BenYishay, Ariel, et al. (författare)
  • The fish is the friend of matriliny: Reef density and matrilineal inheritance
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 127, s. 234-249
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • This paper studies the influence of marine ecology on social institutions of inheritance and descent. In a sample of 79 small-scale horticultural fishing communities in the Solomon Islands, and in samples of 186 to 1,265 societies across the world, we find that coral reef density systematically predicts the prevalence of matrilineal inheritance. Moreover, this result likely reflects adaptation of institutions to ecological conditions, as it holds within ethno-linguistic groups. Reef density explains as much as 10% of the variation in inheritance rules across villages in the Solomon Islands. Explanations based on the sexual division of labor and on inclusive fitness arguments support our results. We also document some of the demographic consequences of matrilineal inheritance, including smaller household and village population size, but find at best weak evidence that matrilineal inheritance translates into higher female economic or political agency.
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7.
  • Bertoli, Simone, et al. (författare)
  • Can selective immigration policies reduce migrants' quality?
  • 2016
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 119, s. 100-109
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Destination countries can adopt selective immigration policies to improve migrants' quality. Screening potential migrants on the basis of observable characteristics also influences their self-selection on unobservables. We propose a model that analyzes the effects of selective immigration policies on migrants' quality, measured by their wages at destination. We show that the prevailing pattern of selection on unobservables influences the effect of an increase in selectivity, which can reduce migrants' quality when migrants are positively self-selected on unobservables. We also demonstrate that, in this case, the quality-maximizing share of educated migrants declines with the scale of migration.
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8.
  • de Quidt, Jonathan, et al. (författare)
  • Commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit
  • 2018
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 134, s. 209-225
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit, and rise in individual liability lending. But empirical evidence is lacking, and there have been no rigorous analyses of possible causes. We first show using the well-known MIX Market dataset that there is evidence for a decline. Second, we show theoretically that commercialization-an increase in competition and a shift from non-profit to for-profit lending (both of which are present in the data)-drives lenders to reduce their use of joint liability loan contracts. Third, we test the model's key predictions, and find support for them in the data.
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9.
  • de Quidt, Jonathan, et al. (författare)
  • Group lending without joint liability
  • 2016
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 121, s. 217-236
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. We are motivated by an apparent shift away from the use of joint liability by microfinance institutions, combined with recent evidence that a) converting joint liability groups to individual-liability groups did not affect repayment rates, and b) an intervention that increased social capital in individual liability borrowing groups led to improved repayment performance. First, we show that individual lending with or without groups may constitute a welfare improvement over joint liability, so long as borrowers have sufficient social capital to sustain mutual insurance. Second, we explore how the lender's lower transaction costs in group lending can encourage insurance by reducing the amount borrowers have to pay to bail one another out. Third, we discuss how group meetings might encourage insurance, either by increasing the incentive to invest in social capital, or because the time spent in meetings can facilitate setting up insurance arrangements. Finally, we perform a simple simulation exercise, evaluating quantitatively the welfare impacts of alternative forms of lending and how they relate to social capital.
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10.
  • Dequiedt, Vianney, et al. (författare)
  • International migration, imperfect information, and brain drain
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878. ; 101, s. 62-78
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants. than for natives. Because of imperfect information, firms statistically dicriminate highly-skilled migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The decision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of highly-skilled workers among the migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementarities, which, because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize them and examine how international migration affects the income of individuals in sending and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves. We also analyze under which conditions there is positive or negative self-selection of migrants.
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