| 1. |
- Allakulov, Umrbek, et al.
(författare)
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Transparency, governance, and water and sanitation : Experimental evidence from schools in rural Bangladesh
- 2023
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 163
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Can transparency interventions improve WASH service provision? We use a randomized experiment to evaluate the impacts of a transparency intervention, a deliberative multi-stakeholder workshop initiated with a community scorecard exercise, in schools in rural Bangladesh. To measure impacts, we combine survey data, direct observations, and administrative data. The intervention leads to moderate but consistent improvements in knowledge of WASH standards and practices, and institutions for WASH service management, but does not improve school WASH service provision or change WASH facility use patterns. Drawing on rich descriptive data, we suggest several reasons why the intervention we evaluate did not improve WASH service outcomes and propose ways to improve the design of future interventions.
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| 2. |
- Almas, Ingvild, et al.
(författare)
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The macroeconomics of pandemics around the world : Lives versus livelihoods revisited
- 2023
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 163
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The COVID-19 pandemic led governments around the world to impose unprecedented restrictions on economic activity. Were these restrictions equally justified in poorer countries with fewer demographic risk factors and less ability to weather economic shocks? We develop and estimate a fully specified model of the macroeconomy with epidemiological dynamics, incorporating subsistence constraints in consumption and allowing preferences over lives versus livelihoodsto vary with income. Poorer countries' demography pushes them unambiguously toward laxer policies. But because both infected and susceptible agents near the subsistence constraint will remain economically active in the face of infection risk and even to some extent under government containment policies, optimal policy in poorer countries pushes in the opposite direction. Moreover, for reasonable income -elasticities of the value of a statistical life, the model can fully rationalize equally strict or stricter policies in poorer countries.
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| 3. |
- Bertoli, Simone, et al.
(författare)
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Can selective immigration policies reduce migrants' quality?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 119, s. 100-109
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Destination countries can adopt selective immigration policies to improve migrants' quality. Screening potential migrants on the basis of observable characteristics also influences their self-selection on unobservables. We propose a model that analyzes the effects of selective immigration policies on migrants' quality, measured by their wages at destination. We show that the prevailing pattern of selection on unobservables influences the effect of an increase in selectivity, which can reduce migrants' quality when migrants are positively self-selected on unobservables. We also demonstrate that, in this case, the quality-maximizing share of educated migrants declines with the scale of migration.
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| 4. |
- Burchardi, Konrad B., et al.
(författare)
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Testing willingness to pay elicitation mechanisms in the field : Evidence from Uganda
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 152
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.
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| 5. |
- de Quidt, Jonathan, et al.
(författare)
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Commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 134, s. 209-225
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit, and rise in individual liability lending. But empirical evidence is lacking, and there have been no rigorous analyses of possible causes. We first show using the well-known MIX Market dataset that there is evidence for a decline. Second, we show theoretically that commercialization-an increase in competition and a shift from non-profit to for-profit lending (both of which are present in the data)-drives lenders to reduce their use of joint liability loan contracts. Third, we test the model's key predictions, and find support for them in the data.
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| 6. |
- de Quidt, Jonathan, et al.
(författare)
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Group lending without joint liability
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 121, s. 217-236
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. We are motivated by an apparent shift away from the use of joint liability by microfinance institutions, combined with recent evidence that a) converting joint liability groups to individual-liability groups did not affect repayment rates, and b) an intervention that increased social capital in individual liability borrowing groups led to improved repayment performance. First, we show that individual lending with or without groups may constitute a welfare improvement over joint liability, so long as borrowers have sufficient social capital to sustain mutual insurance. Second, we explore how the lender's lower transaction costs in group lending can encourage insurance by reducing the amount borrowers have to pay to bail one another out. Third, we discuss how group meetings might encourage insurance, either by increasing the incentive to invest in social capital, or because the time spent in meetings can facilitate setting up insurance arrangements. Finally, we perform a simple simulation exercise, evaluating quantitatively the welfare impacts of alternative forms of lending and how they relate to social capital.
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| 7. |
- Dequiedt, Vianney, et al.
(författare)
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International migration, imperfect information, and brain drain
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 101, s. 62-78
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants. than for natives. Because of imperfect information, firms statistically dicriminate highly-skilled migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The decision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of highly-skilled workers among the migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementarities, which, because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize them and examine how international migration affects the income of individuals in sending and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves. We also analyze under which conditions there is positive or negative self-selection of migrants.
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| 8. |
- Downey, Mitch
(författare)
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Did the war on terror deter ungoverned spaces? Not in Africa
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 151
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many of the world's poorest citizens live in peripheral spaces their states have chosen not to control. Leaving these spaces ungoverned poses challenges for development, global terrorism, and conflict. Can the international community induce countries to invest in controlling their territory? I consider the Bush Administration's foreign policy, which, following the September 11th attacks, demanded that countries take active steps to reduce terrorist safe havens or risk a US invasion. Drawing upon recent work on the determinants of government control, I develop a difference-in-difference strategy to test for evidence of government expansions and implement this test using subnational data on conflict, government presence, and public goods in Africa. Across a wide range of specifications and measures, I consistently find precise estimates suggesting African states did not engage in these expansions. The results suggest that broad-based deterrence is an ineffective policy strategy to reduce ungoverned spaces.
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| 9. |
- Fredriksson, Anders
(författare)
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Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 108, s. 256-273
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Intermediaries that assist individuals and firms with the government bureaucracy are common in developing countries. Although such bureaucracy intermediaries are, anecdotally, linked with corruption and welfare losses, few formal analyses exist. We introduce a model in which a government license can benefit individuals. We study the net license gain when individuals get the license through the regular licensing procedure, through bribing or through intermediaries. For a given procedure, individuals using intermediaries are better off than if intermediaries and corruption had not existed. Then, we study the incentives of corrupt bureaucrats to create red tape. Bureaucrats implement more red tape and individuals are unambiguously worse off in a setting with intermediaries than with direct corruption only. Intermediaries can thus improve access to the bureaucracy, but also strengthen the incentives to create red tape a potential explanation why licensing procedures tend to be long in developing countries.
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| 10. |
- Madajewicz, Malgosia, et al.
(författare)
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How does delegating decisions to communities affect the provision and use of a public service? : Evidence from a field experiment in Bangladesh*
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878 .- 1872-6089. ; 150
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Most development practitioners would list engaging communities in the provision of public services among best practices for improving access. However, whether community participation enhances provision and use of public services relative to a non-participatory approach is largely unknown because few studies compare impacts when the same public service intervention is implemented with and without community participation. This field experiment compares three approaches to providing safe water in rural Bangladesh. Delegating decisions to the community increases use of safe water by about 80% relative to a top-down provider making the same decisions but only when the approach to delegating decisions limits elite influence.
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