| 1. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation
- 2014
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Ingår i: Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 58:2, s. 219-244
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users' profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.
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| 2. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Electricity provision with intermittent sources of energy
- 2012
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Ingår i: Resource and Energy Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0928-7655. ; 34:3, s. 319-336
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze the interaction between a reliable source of electricity production and intermittent sources such as wind or solar power. We first characterize the optimal energy mix, emphasizing the availability of the intermittent source as a major parameter for the optimal investment in capacity. We then analyze decentralization through competitive market mechanisms. We show that decentralizing the efficient energy mix requires electricity to be priced contingently on the availability of the intermittent source. By contrast. traditional meters impose uniform pricing, which distorts the optimal mix of energy sources. Decentralizing the efficient energy mix with uniform prices requires either cross-subsidies from the intermittent source to the reliable source of energy or structural integration of the two types of technology. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 3. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Policy Spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - : Elsevier BV. - 0095-0696 .- 1096-0449. ; 87 (2018), s. 114-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities, potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope, and not enough with economies of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump-sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs.
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| 4. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Prices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutants
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We examine the choice of policy instrument price, quantity, or a mix of the two when two pollutants are regulated and firms’ abatement costs are private information. A key parameter that affects this choice is the technological externality between the abatement efforts involved, i.e., whether they are substitutes or complements. If they are complements, a mix policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on the other is sometime preferable, even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mix policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.
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| 5. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - : Elsevier BV. - 0095-0696 .- 1096-0449. ; 22:1, s. 123-140
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas
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| 6. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Regulation of a Spatial Externality: Refuges versus tax for managing pest resistance
- 2012
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Ingår i: Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 51:1, s. 79-104
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We examine regulations for managing pest resistance to pesticide varieties in a temporally and spatially explicit framework. We compare the performance of the EPA’s mandatory refuges and a tax (or subsidy) on the pesticide variety under several biological assumptions on pest mobility and the heterogeneity of farmers’ pest vulnerability. We find that only the tax (or subsidy) restores efficiency if pest mobility is perfect within the area. If pest mobility is imperfect and when farmers face identical pest vulnerability, only the refuge might restore efficiency. With simulations we illustrate that complex outcomes may arise for intermediate levels of pest mobility and farmers’ heterogeneity. Our results shed light on the choice of regulatory instruments for common-pool resource regulations where spatial localization matters.
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| 7. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Regulation via the Polluter-pays Principle
- 2016
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Ingår i: Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 126:593, s. 884-906
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays (PP) principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the PP principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that induces non-negative individual welfare change and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact. We extend both the PP principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due to pollution. We also compare the PP principle with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves scheme.
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| 8. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Spatial Efficiency of Genetically Modified and Non-Genetically Modified Crops
- 2015
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Ingår i: Strategic Behavior and the Environment. - : Now Publishers. - 1944-012X .- 1944-0138. ; 5:1, s. 31-59
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When GM (genetically modified) and non-GM crops coexist, not all of the latter can be sold as GM-free crops as some of them will likely be contaminated by GM crops. The choice of producing non-GM crops will consequently depend on the surrounding crops. We therefore analyze the spatial distribution of GM and non-GM crops. When producers follow individual strategies, many spatial configurations arise in equilibrium, some of which are more efficient than others. We examine how coordination among producers impacts the spatial distribution of crop varieties, and show that coordination among only a small number of producers can greatly improve efficiency. In particular, a non-GM producer neighboring two GM producers needs to coordinate with only one of them to eliminate any spatial inefficiency from variety choices.
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| 9. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Strategic environmental regulation of multiple pollutants
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control global and local pollution such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities (global versus local), potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of local pollution are distorted if the local regulators anticipate that global pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too (not enough) stringent when abatement e¤orts exhibit economies (diseconomies) of scope. In contrast, we obtain e¢ ciency if the global pollutant is regulated by tax provided that the revenues from taxing emissions are redistributed to the local communities in a lump-sum way.
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| 10. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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The distributional impact of common-pool resource regulations
- 2011
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Ingår i: Indian Growth and Development Review. - : Emerald. - 1753-8254. ; 4:2, s. 123-141
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Regulating common-pool resources is welfare enhancing for society but not necessarily for all users who therefore may oppose regulations. We examine the short-term impact of common-pool resource regulations on welfare distribution. Market-based regulations such as fees and subsidies or tradable quotas achieve a higher reduction of extraction from free-access than individual quotas with the same proportion of betteroff users. They make also more users better-off for the same resource preservation. The quota regulation has attractive fairness properties: it reduces inequality while still rewarding the more efficient users.
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