| 1. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Local public goods and income heterogeneity
- 2006
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Ingår i: The theory and practice of environmental and resource economics. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham. - 1845426495 - 9781845426491 ; , s. 85-101
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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A Note on Public Goods in a Decentralized Fiscal Union : Implications of a Participation Constraint
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Urban Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0094-1190 .- 1095-9068. ; 84, s. 1-8
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper re-examines the question of whether federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds leads to under-provision of public goods when member states may leave the economic federation. We show that federal ex-post redistribution under a binding participation constraint does not necessarily mean under-provision of local and federal public goods.
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| 4. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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An optimal tax approach to alcohol policy
- 2010
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Ingår i: Finanzarchiv. - : Mohr Siebeck. - 0015-2218 .- 1614-0974. ; 66:2, s. 153-169
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported, or produced illegally. Border trade alone implies an incentive to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities that are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. The income tax will also be used as a corrective instrument. Furthermore, although the effects of adding illegal production are ambiguous in general, a realistic outcome is, nevertheless, that it reduces both the optimal alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.
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| 5. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Efficient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination
- 2004
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 88:12, s. 2711-2725
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper is related to the literature on optimal nonlinear taxation under right-to-manage wage formation, and we assume that the fall-back profit facing firms during wage bargaining depends on the profit they can obtain if moving production abroad. The purpose is to study how policy coordination among countries can be used to increase the welfare level in comparison with an uncoordinated equilibrium. We consider coordinated policy reforms with respect to the marginal taxation of labor income, the unemployment benefit and the provision of a public good. The results show that policy coordination that leads to fewer hours of work per employee and/or a reduction of the unemployment benefit will increase welfare compared to the uncoordinated equilibrium.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Mixed Taxation and Transboundary Externalities : A Model with Large Jurisdictions
- 2014
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Ingår i: Public Finance Review. - : Sage Publications. - 1091-1421 .- 1552-7530. ; 42:2, s. 254-282
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns income taxation and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to influence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, affect the domestic use of taxation. Finally, with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare effects of policy coordination.
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| 8. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Mixed taxation, public goods and transboundary externalities : a model with large jurisdictions
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, production taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world-market producer price of the externality-generating commodity. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to influence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, affect the domestic use of taxation and public goods. Finally, with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare effects of policy coordination.
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| 9. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal income taxation and social norms in the Labor market
- 2010
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Ingår i: International Tax and Public Finance. - : Springer. - 0927-5940 .- 1573-6970. ; 17:1, s. 67-89
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One norm refers to “normal behavior” with respect to work hours (the hours of work norm), whereas another means that “one should earn one’s living by working” (the participation norm). The results show how the hours of work norm gives rise to a corrective motive for using income taxation. We also show how the interaction between the hours of work norm and the private incentive to participate in the labor market (which reflects the participation norm) gives rise to an employment motive for using the income tax.
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| 10. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal taxation and asymmetric information in an economy with second-hand trade
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal income and commodity taxation in a two-type overlapping generations model, where used durable goods are traded in a second-hand market. As second-hand transactions are difficult to observe, we assume that the government is unable to directly control second-hand transactions via commodity taxation. A basic question is how the government in this case may use the second-hand market as a channel for relaxation of the self-selection constraint. We show how the appearance of a second-hand market for used durable goods affects the optimal use of labor income and capital income taxation as well as the optimal use of commodity taxation on new durable goods.
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