| 1. |
- Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, et al.
(författare)
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Roman Roads to Prosperity: Persistence and Non-Persistence of Public Goods Provision
- 2018
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- How persistent is public goods provision in a comparative perspective? We explore the link between infrastructure investments made during antiquity and the presence of infrastructure today, as well as the link between early infrastructure and economic activity both in the past and in the present, across the entire area under dominion of the Roman Empire at the zenith of its geographical extension (117 CE). We find a remarkable pattern of persistence showing that greater Roman road density goes along with (a) greater modern road density, (b) greater settlement for-mation in 500 CE, and (c) greater economic activity in 2010. Interestingly, however, the degree of persistence in road density and the link between early road density and contemporary economic development is weakened to the point of insignificance in areas where the use of wheeled vehicles was abandoned from the first millennium CE until the late modern period. Taken at face value, our results suggest that infrastructure may be one important channel through which persistence in comparative development comes about.
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| 2. |
- Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, et al.
(författare)
-
Why Are Market Economies Politically Stable? A Theory of Capitalist Cohesion
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The present paper documents that political stability is positively associated with the extent of domestic trade. In explaining this reg- ularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market ex- change, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the prefer- ences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that en- hance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization become su¢ ciently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non- cooperative under self-sufficiency, the political decision making process becomes cooperative in the market economy, as the welfare of individ- uals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods.
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| 3. |
- Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, et al.
(författare)
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Windfall Gains, Political Economy, and Economic Development
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Natural resource rents and foreign aid have the character of windfall gains that affect economic outcomes both directly and indirectly. Several studies have shown that the indirect effect typically works via institutions like corruption. In this article, we offer a theoretical framework for a joint analysis of how natural resources and aid potentially affect total output in society through rent seeking activities. We survey the existing evidence on both direct and indirect effects of windfalls and provide some new empirical evidence of the association between aid/natural resources and institutions in a large cross-section of countries. Our results suggest that whereas more aid means less corruption, natural resource rents is positively correlated with corruption, although both relationships are nonlinear.
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