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Sökning: WFRF:(Fernandez Carro R.)

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  • Morales, J. C., et al. (författare)
  • A giant exoplanet orbiting a very-low-mass star challenges planet formation models
  • 2019
  • Ingår i: Science. - : American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). - 0036-8075 .- 1095-9203. ; 365:6460, s. 1441-1445
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Surveys have shown that super-Earth and Neptune-mass exoplanets are more frequent than gas giants around low-mass stars, as predicted by the core accretion theory of planet formation. We report the discovery of a giant planet around the very-low-mass star GJ 3512, as determined by optical and near-infrared radial-velocity observations. The planet has a minimum mass of 0.46 Jupiter masses, very high for such a small host star, and an eccentric 204-day orbit. Dynamical models show that the high eccentricity is most likely due to planet-planet interactions. We use simulations to demonstrate that the GJ 3512 planetary system challenges generally accepted formation theories, and that it puts constraints on the planet accretion and migration rates. Disk instabilities may be more efficient in forming planets than previously thought.
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  • Fernandez-Carro, R., et al. (författare)
  • The Emperor's clothes and the Pied Piper: Bureaucracy and scientific productivity
  • 2016
  • Ingår i: Science and Public Policy. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0302-3427 .- 1471-5430. ; 43:4, s. 546-561
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • For some scholars, bureaucratic contracts (i.e. low-powered and highly regulated) mitigate problems of time inconsistency between public employees who have undertaken costly asset-specific investments, and potentially opportunistic governments. For others, bureaucratic contracts exacerbate information asymmetries between bureaucratic experts and political dilettantes. This paper aims to reconcile these views by proposing two testable propositions: while bureaucratic impartiality has a positive effect because it reduces time inconsistency problems in the relationship between principals (governments) and agents (public employees), a bureaucratic career has, on the contrary, a negative effect because it reduces incentives. We test these hypotheses with three samples of countries (worldwide, OECD and EU) using scientific productivity as a proxy for public employees' performance that can be compared across countries. The results show how, controlling for levels of development and investment, proxies for bureaucratic impartiality show a significant positive effect on scientific productivity while the existence of bureaucratic careers significantly diminishes scientists' performance. © The Author 2015.
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