| 1. |
- Koskuvi, Marja, et al.
(author)
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Lower complement C1q levels in first-episode psychosis and in schizophrenia
- 2024
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In: Brain, Behavior, and Immunity. - : Elsevier. - 0889-1591 .- 1090-2139. ; 117, s. 313-319
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Recent evidence has implicated complement component (C) 4A in excessive elimination of synapses in schizophrenia. C4A is believed to contribute to physiological synapse removal through signaling within the C1q initiated classical activation axis of the complement system. So far, a potential involvement of C1q in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia remains unclear. In this study, we first utilized large-scale gene expression datasets (n = 586 patients with schizophrenia and n = 986 controls) to observe lower C1QA mRNA expression in prefrontal cortex tissue of individuals with schizophrenia (P = 4.8x10-05), while C1QA seeded co-expression networks displayed no enrichment for schizophrenia risk variants beyond C4A. We then used targeted liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LS-MS) to measure cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) levels of C1qA in 113 individuals with first-episode psychosis (FEP), among which 66 individuals was later diagnosed with schizophrenia, and 87 healthy controls. CSF concentrations of C1qA were lower in individuals diagnosed with FEP (P = 0.0001), also after removing subjects with a short-term prescription of an antipsychotic agent (P = 0.0005). We conclude that C1q mRNA and protein levels are lower in schizophrenia and that further experimental studies are needed to understand the functional implications.
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| 2. |
- Carlander, Anders, 1979, et al.
(author)
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Choices of savings options related to trust in banks’ competence, benevolence and stability
- 2013
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In: Journal of Financial Services Marketing. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1363-0539 .- 1479-1846. ; 18:2, s. 121-136
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The study investigates whether beliefs in professional investor skill in conjunction with trust in banks and other fund managers explain choices of options for long-term savings. From questionnaire data obtained for a population-based sample (n=178) and a sample of undergraduates (n=186), two index measures were constructed, one of beliefs in the skill of professional investors and another of trust in fund managers. The trust index was aggregated for the three interrelated components: competence, benevolence and stability. Regression analyses of the likelihood of savings in an actively managed fund showed an expected effect of investor-skill beliefs that was mediated by trust in the fund manager. In addition, self-reported knowledge played a larger role than trust for choices of passively managed index funds and in particular for own investment in stocks.
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| 3. |
- Carlander, Anders, 1979, et al.
(author)
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The role of perceived quality of personal service in influencing trust and satisfaction with banks
- 2018
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In: Financial Services Review. - 1057-0810. ; 27, s. 83-98
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Trust is of paramount importance to banks. Previous research has shown that trust increases with repeated personal contacts. We investigate if this applies to the customer-employee relationship in banks. Data from an on-line survey of 293 customers of Swedish retail banks are used to construct indicator measures. By means of structural equation modeling we find that trust in the bank is influenced by perceived quality of personal service through employees’ perceived competence, perceived benevolence, and perceived transparency, and that satisfaction with the bank is influenced by perceived quality of personal service through perceived competence, perceived benevolence, perceived transparency, and trust.
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| 4. |
- Dijk, Oege, et al.
(author)
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Rank matters-The impact of social competition on portfolio choice
- 2014
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In: European Economic Review. - : Elsevier BV. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 66, s. 97-110
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Tournament incentives' schemes have been criticized for inducing excessive risk-taking among financial market participants. In this paper we investigate how relative performance-based incentive schemes and status concerns for higher rank influence portfolio choice in laboratory experiments. We find that both underperformers and over-performers adapt their portfolios to their current relative performance, preferring either positively or negatively skewed assets, respectively. Most importantly, these results hold both when relative performance is instrumental for higher payoffs in a tournament and when it is only intrinsically motivating and not payout-relevant. We find no effects when no relative performance information is given. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
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| 5. |
- Doukas, John, et al.
(author)
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Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations
- 2002
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In: European Financial Management. - 1354-7798. ; 8:3, s. 281-314
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder’s investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.
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| 6. |
- Fabretti, Annalisa, et al.
(author)
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Convex incentives in financial markets: an agent-based analysis
- 2017
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In: Decisions in Economics and Finance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1593-8883 .- 1129-6569. ; 40:1-2, s. 375-395
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- © 2017, Springer-Verlag Italia S.r.l. We investigate whether convex incentive contracts are a source of instability of financial markets as indicated by the results of a continuous double-auction asset market experiment performed by Holmen et al. (J Econ Dyn Control 40:179–194, 2014). We develop a model to replicate the setting of the experiment and perform an agent-based simulation where agents have linear or convex incentives. Extending the simulation by varying features of actual asset markets that were not studied in the experiment, our main results show that increasing the number of convex incentive contracts increases prices and volatility and decreases market liquidity, measured both as bid–ask spreads and volumes. We also observe that the influence of risk aversion on traders’ decisions decreases when there are convex contracts and that increasing the differences in initial wealth among the traders has similar effects as increasing number of convex incentive contracts.
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| 7. |
- Gärling, Tommy, 1941, et al.
(author)
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Fast and Slow Investments in Asset Markets: Influences on Risk Taking
- 2019
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In: Behavioral Finance Working Group Conference. London: 6-7 June 2019.
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Conference paper (other academic/artistic)abstract
- In an experiment business school students (n=123) role play being investment managers in a fund company incentivized by rank-based performance compensations. Investments are made at self-paced rates in stocks with normal return distributions varying in expected value and variance. Results show that investments increase above but decrease and are relatively more risky below a relative comparison standard. Above the comparison standard, hypothetical monetary bonuses do not increase risk taking more than non-monetary bonuses, while below the comparison standard hypothetical monetary penalties suppress risk taking more than non-monetary penalties do. Compared to a control condition with no relative comparison standard and hypothetical incentives, risk taking is lower below but not different above the comparison standard. The difference in results suggest that time pressure and complexity of strategic optimization are determinants of elevated risk taking in asset market experiments investigating effects of rank-based performance compensations.
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| 8. |
- Gärling, Tommy, 1941, et al.
(author)
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Fast and slow investments in asset markets: Influences on risk taking
- 2021
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In: Journal of Behavioral Finance. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1542-7560 .- 1542-7579. ; 22:1, s. 84-96
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- © 2020, © 2020 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. The aim is to investigate whether elevated risk taking in asset market experiments driven by rank-based performance incentives decrease if removing a time limit on choices and minimizing complexity of strategic optimization. In a scenario experiment, business school students (n = 123) acting as investment managers in a fund company make investments at self-paced rates. The results show that investments are influenced by rank-based compensations implemented as a relative comparison standard but not that risk taking is elevated. The motive to minimize losses relative to others appear to counteract risk taking, particularly if poor performance is penalized by reducing the fixed income.
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| 9. |
- Gärling, Tommy, 1941, et al.
(author)
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Financial risk-taking related to individual risk preference, social comparison and competition
- 2021
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In: Review of Behavioral Finance. - 1940-5979. ; 13:2, s. 125-140
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how social comparison and motivation to compete account for elevated risk-taking in fund management corroborated by asset market experiments when performance depends on rank-based incentives. Design/methodology/approach – In two laboratory experiments, university students (n1 5 240/n2 5 120) make choices between risky and certain outcomes of hypothetical sums of money. Both experiments investigate in which direction risky choices in an individual condition (individual risk preference) are shifted when participants compare their performance to another participant’s performance (social comparison), being instructed or not to outperform the other (incentive to compete). Findings – In the absence of incentives to compete, participants tend to minimize the differences between expected outcomes to themselves and to the other, but when provided with incentives to compete, they tend to maximize these differences. An independent additional increase in risk-taking is observed when participants are provided with incentives to compete. Originality/value – Original findings include that social comparison does not evoke motivation to compete unless incentives are offered and that increases in risk-taking depend both on what the other chooses and the incentives.
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| 10. |
- Hagelin, Niclas, et al.
(author)
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Family Ownership, Dual Class Shares and Risk Management
- 2006
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In: Global Finance Journal. - : Elsevier BV. - 1044-0283. ; 16:3, s. 283-301
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We investigate whether the use of dual-class shares affects the financial policy of Swedish public corporations. Specifically, we distinguish between firms that are controlled by owners with poor portfolio diversification (families) and those controlled by owners with diversified portfolios (institutions). We find that, on average, family-controlled firms do not rely on less debt, more corporate diversification, or more financial hedging than non-family firms do. For family-controlled firms, however, we find that controlling owners with higher vote-to-capital ratios are associated with firms with less debt and lower probabilities of hedging. This evidence is consistent with the perception that family-controlled firms use shares with different voting rights so as simultaneously to maintain control and reduce the family's portfolio risk.
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