| 1. |
- Hauge, Karen Evelyn, et al.
(författare)
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Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al. 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load, to test if greed is affected by the load. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results show consistently that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects’ decisions are more driven by their feelings and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.
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| 2. |
- Hauge, K. E., et al.
(författare)
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Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 19:3, s. 562-576
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al., in Nature 489:427-430, 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load to test if greed is affected by the load. This is tested in three different dictator game experiments. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from all three experiments show that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects' decisions are more impulsive and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.
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| 3. |
- Johansson, Lars-Olof, 1957, et al.
(författare)
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Goal conflicts in political decision making: a survey of municipality politicians' view of road pricing.
- 2004
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Ingår i: Environment & Planning C: Government & Policy. - 0263-774X .- 1472-3425. ; 21:4, s. 615-624
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Investigates the existence of goal conflicts in political decision-making in the case of municipality politicians in Sweden on the issue of road pricing scheme. Goals of municipality politicians other than reducing car use; Possibility of failure in achieving environmental goals because of goal conflicts.
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| 6. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Hypothetical bias in choice experiments: Within versus between subject tests
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A choice experiment eliciting environmental values is set up in order to test for hypothetical bias based on both within and between sample designs. A larger hypothetical bias was found in the latter case, which explains parts of the previous diverging results in the literature. People seem to prefer to do what they say they would do.
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| 7. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Self image and choice experiments: hypothetical and actual willingness to pay
- 2003
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper proposes that people derive utility from a positive self-image, influenced by ethical views, internal honesty, and consistency between sequential choices. A model is tested by conducting the same choice-experiment for two WWF-campaigns in three different contexts. It predicts that marginal WTP for contributions to these campaigns is highest when choices are hypothetical, lower in a real-money experiment that follows a hypothetical experiment, and lowest when real-money choices are made directly. Additionally, it predicts that marginal WTP decreases with the scale of financial incentives in a real-money experiment. The empirical results are consistent with these hypotheses.
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| 8. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Self-image and valuation of moral goods: Stated versus actual willingness to pay
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 84:3, s. 879-891
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Hypothetical bias in stated-preference methods appears sometimes to be very large, and other times non-existent. This is here largely explained by a model where people derive utility from a positive self-image associated with morally commendable behavior. The results of a choice experiment are consistent with the predictions of this model: the hypothetical marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a moral good (contributions to a WWF project) is significantly higher than the corresponding real-money MWTP, whereas no hypothetical bias is seen for an amoral good (a restaurant voucher). Moreover, the evidence suggests that also the real-money MWTP for the moral good is biased upwards, in the sense that it appears to be higher within than outside the experimental context. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 9. |
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 1966, et al.
(författare)
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Self-Image and Valuation of Moral Goods: Stated versus Real Willingness to Pay
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Hypothetical bias in stated-preference methods appears sometimes to be very large, and other times non-existent. This is here largely explained by a model where people derive utility from a positive self-image associated with morally commendable behavior. The results of a choice experiment are consistent with the predictions of this model; the hypothetical marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a moral good (contributions to a WWF project) is significantly higher than the corresponding real MWTP, whereas no hypothetical bias is present for an amoral good (a restaurant voucher). Moreover, both the theoretical model and the experimental evidence suggest that also the real MWTP for the moral good is biased upwards by being higher within than outside the experimental context.
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| 10. |
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