| 1. |
- Hagelin, Niclas, et al.
(författare)
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Managerial Stock Options and the Hedging Premium
- 2007
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Ingår i: European Financial Management. - 1354-7798 .- 1468-036X. ; 13:4, s. 721-741
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether hedging increases firm value. Some studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that when hedging is based upon incentives from managers’ options, firm value decreases.
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| 2. |
- Holmén, Martin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Inside shareholders’ effective tax rates and dividends
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Banking & Finance. - : Elsevier BV. - 0378-4266 .- 1872-6372. ; 32:9, s. 1860-1869
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using information collected from the Swedish tax authorities, we calculate insiders’ actual effective tax rates on dividends. With this unique dataset, we find a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between insiders’ effective tax rates and dividend payout. This result is consistent with a tax-induced clientele effect for dividends. We also look at the impact of large block trades on dividends. We find that when insiders with zero effective taxes sell blocks, subsequent dividend payments are significantly more likely to decrease. This provides evidence that large shareholders are adjusting dividends for their individual tax situations.
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| 3. |
- Holmén, Martin, et al.
(författare)
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Minority Shareholder Protection and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers
- 2004
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Ingår i: Journal of Finanical and Quantitative Analysis. - 0022-1090. ; 39:1, s. 167-191
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual class shares and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden’s extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish Mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden’s extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.
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| 4. |
- Holmén, Martin, et al.
(författare)
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Trading-off Corporate Control and Personal Diversification through Capital Structure and Merger Acivity
- 2007
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Ingår i: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. - : Wiley. - 0306-686X .- 1468-5957. ; 34:9-10, s. 1470-1495
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this study we use direct estimates of the portfolio diversification of the largest shareholder in a firm to study the impact of shareholder diversification on the firm. For firms where the controlling shareholder is an individual our tests indicate that the owner-managers use debt, dual class shares and corporate control transactions (merger activity) to strategically trade off corporate control and the drawback of poor portfolio diversification. However, for firms where the controlling shareholder is an institution, our results indicate that control but not diversification is important.
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