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- Bastos Lima, Mairon G., et al.
(författare)
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Large-scale collective action to avoid an Amazon tipping point - key actors and interventions
- 2021
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Ingår i: Current Research in Environmental Sustainability. - : Elsevier BV. - 2666-0490. ; 3
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The destruction of the Amazon is a major global environmental issue, not only because of greenhouse gas emissions or direct impacts on biodiversity and livelihoods, but also due to the forest's role as a tipping element in the Earth System. With nearly a fifth of the Amazon already lost, there are already signs of an imminent forest dieback process that risks transforming much of the rainforest into a drier ecosystem, with climatic implications across the globe. There is a large body of literature on the underlying drivers of Amazon deforestation. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the behavioral and institutional microfoundations of change. Fundamental issues concerning cooperation, as well as the mechanisms facilitating or hampering such actions, can play a much more central role in attempts to unravel and address Amazon deforestation. We thus present the issue of preventing the Amazon biome from crossing a biophysical tipping point as a large-scale collective action problem. Drawing from collective action theory, we apply a novel analytical framework on Amazon conservation, identifying six variables that synthesize relevant collective action stressors and facilitators: information, accountability, harmony of interests, horizontal trust, knowledge about consequences, and sense of responsibility. Drawing upon literature and data, we assess Amazon deforestation and conservation through our heuristic lens, showing that while growing transparency has made information availability a collective action facilitator, lack of accountability, distrust among actors, and little sense of responsibility for halting deforestation remain key stressors. We finalize by discussing interventions that can help break the gridlock.
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| 2. |
- Fischer, Carolyn, et al.
(författare)
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The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System
- 2020
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Ingår i: The Columbia journal of European law. - 1076-6715. ; 26:2, s. 1-28
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When it first launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) expected to see carbon dioxide prices of around €30/ton and be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of muted incentives for investment in the technology and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with various administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (“backloading”) and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (“the market stability reserve”). While prices have now begun to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures are sufficient to adequately support the price of carbon dioxide into the future. In the meantime, governments outside the EU ETS have begun turning away from carbon pricing and adopting overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices. Unfortunately, however, this further undermines confidence in market-based mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Other carbon markets have responded to such by introducing an auction reserve price that sets a minimum price in allowance auctions, thus avoiding the unexpectedly low price outcomes experienced in the EU ETS. Opponents of instituting such an auction reserve price in the EU ETS express two main concerns. First, they fear that a minimum auction price would interfere with the quantity-based nature of the market. Second, they argue that a reserve price would be tantamount to a tax, thus triggering a burdensome decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States that would be difficult to overcome. This Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis concludes that, inasmuch as an auction reserve price is not a “provision primarily of a fiscal nature,” nor would it “significantly affect a Member State's choice between different energy sources,” no legal barriers stand in the way of the introduction of an auction reserve price into the EU ETS. We then describe two ways by which a reserve price could be introduced into this system.
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| 4. |
- Jagers, Sverker C., 1967, et al.
(författare)
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On the preconditions for large-scale collective action
- 2020
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Ingår i: Ambio. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0044-7447 .- 1654-7209. ; 49:7
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity's most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and large-scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.
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| 5. |
- Johansson, Markus, 1985, et al.
(författare)
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A risk framework for optimising policies for deep decarbonisation technologies
- 2021
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Ingår i: Energy Research and Social Science. - : Elsevier BV. - 2214-6296 .- 2214-6326. ; 82
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Massive resource infusion and coordination between state and market actors are needed to develop and diffuse deep decarbonisation technologies. This makes wise policy design imperative. Policy-makers are confronted with a plethora of diverging views on which policies are preferable for a low carbon transition, and which interventions, such as R&D funding, information, environmental taxes, or bans, should be employed to achieve necessary and sufficient technological transformation. Focusing on market and technological investment risks, we offer a conceptual framework that explains why no silver bullet policy or single theoretical approach exists in regard to decarbonisation. Our framework highlights that policies need to be designed with these risks in mind and aids in the key task of matching problems and policies, thereby also facilitating judicious use of resources to optimise climate benefits from resources spent.
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