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- Hasson, Reviva, et al.
(författare)
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Climate Change in a Public Goods Game: Investment Decision in Mitigation versus Adaptation
- 2009
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We use behavioral and experimental economics to study a particular aspect of the economics of climate change: the potential tradeoff between countries’ investments in mitigation versus adaptation. While mitigation of greenhouse gases can be viewed as a public good, adaptation to climate change is a private good, benefiting only the country or the individual that invests in adaptation. We use a one-shot public-goods game that deviates from the standard public-goods game by introducing a stochastic term to account for probabilistic destruction in a climate-change setting. Probability density function is mapped to within-group levels of mitigation. We compare low-vulnerability and high-vulnerability treatments by varying the magnitude of disaster across treatments. Our results show that there is no significant difference in the level of mitigation across these treatments. Further, our results emphasize the important role of trust in enhancing cooperation.
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| 2. |
- Hasson, R, et al.
(författare)
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Treatment Effects of Climate Change Risk on Mitigation and Adaptation Behavior in an Experimental Setting
- 2012
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Ingår i: South African Journal of Economics. - 0038-2280. ; 80:3, s. 415-430
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores the collective action problem as it relates to climate change and develops two models that capture the mitigation–adaptation trade-off. The first model presents climate change as a disaster that will occur with certainty, and where both mitigation and adaptation reduce the size of the loss associated with the disaster (the so-called deterministic model). The second model presents climate change as an uncertain event, where mitigation affects the probability of disaster while adaptation again reduces the size of the loss (this is the so-called stochastic model). Comparing the two models in a one-shot public goods experiment with students, we find no significant differences in subjects' choice to mitigate. The experiments also reveal a relatively low rate of mitigation for both models compared with earlier studies.
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