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- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Continuous Model of Income Insurance
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Tax and Public Finance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0927-5940 .- 1573-6970. ; 20:6, s. 938-960
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we treat an individual's health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is assumed that the individual is either able or unable to work. A continuous treatment of an individual's health sheds new light on the role of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in the traditional, dichotomous models. In particular, we show that moral hazard is not necessarily outright fraud, but a gradual adjustment of the willingness to work, depending on preferences and the conditions stated in the insurance contract. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims, and it clarifies the conditions for the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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| 2. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents
- 2020
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Ingår i: European Economic Review. - : Elsevier BV. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 129
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze an investor who delegates information acquisition and investment decisions to an agent. The investor cannot monitor the agent's effort or information. Optimal pay schemes contain bonuses that increase with the net return rate of the investment, but, unlike conventional contracts, at a decreasing rate. Moreover, investments with low return rates are penalized, again unlike conventional contracts. Nevertheless, it may be optimal for the investor to reward the agent above the agent's reservation utility. We examine the role of the agent's risk attitude for the shape of the pay scheme, and whether firing after bad investments is a more effective threat than reduced pay. We also analyze how the nature of the contract changes if the agent is given bargaining power.
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| 7. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Lärdomar av finanskrisen
- 2010
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk debatt. - Stockholm : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; :4
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 8. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Sickness Absence and Local Benefit Cultures
- 2016
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Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - : Wiley. - 0347-0520 .- 1467-9442. ; 118:1, s. 49-78
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In many countries, sickness absence financed by generous insurance benefits is an important concern in the policy debate. There are strong variations in absence behavior among local geographical areas. Such variations are difficult to explain in terms of observable socioeconomic factors. In this paper, we investigate whether such variations are related to group effects in the form of social interaction among individuals within neighborhoods. Well-known methodological problems arise when trying to answer this question. A special feature of our efforts to deal with these problems is that we adopt several alternative approaches to identify group effects. Our study is based on a rich set of Swedish panel data, and we find indications of group effects in each of our approaches.
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| 9. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
- 2003
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Ingår i: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 1:2-3, s. 533-542
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare‐state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.
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| 10. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms in Social Insurance
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Political Economy. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0022-3808 .- 1537-534X. ; 126, s. s116-S139
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard, and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the information available to norm enforcers. This highlights one important aspect of norms, namely, that they may compensate for the insurer's limited information.
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