| 1. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Continuous Model of Income Insurance
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a simple yet realistic model of income insurance, where the individual’s ability and willingness to work is treated as a continuous variable. In this framework, income insurance not only provides income smoothing, it also relieves the individual from particularly burdensome work. As a result, the individual adjusts his labor supply in a continuous fashion to the implicit tax wedge of the insurance system. Moral hazard, in the sense that an individual receives insurance benefits without actually being fully qualified, also becomes a matter of degree. Moreover, our continuous framework makes it easy to analyze both the role of administrative rejection of claims, and the role of social norms, for the utilization of insurance.
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| 2. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Continuous Model of Income Insurance
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Tax and Public Finance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0927-5940 .- 1573-6970. ; 20:6, s. 938-960
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we treat an individual's health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is assumed that the individual is either able or unable to work. A continuous treatment of an individual's health sheds new light on the role of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in the traditional, dichotomous models. In particular, we show that moral hazard is not necessarily outright fraud, but a gradual adjustment of the willingness to work, depending on preferences and the conditions stated in the insurance contract. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims, and it clarifies the conditions for the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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| 3. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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| 4. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A large literature on ex ante moral hazard in income insurance emphasizes that the individual can affect the probability of an income loss by choice of lifestyle and hence, the degree of risk-taking. The much smaller literature on moral hazard ex post mainly analyzes how a “moral hazard constraint” can make the individual abstain from fraud (“mimicking”). The present paper instead presents a model of moral hazard ex post without a moral hazard constraint; the individual's ability and willingness to work is represented by a continuous stochastic variable in the utility function, and the extent of moral hazard depends on the generosity of the insurance system. Our model is also well suited for analyzing social norms concerning work and benefit dependency.
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| 5. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Job Security and Work Absence : Evidence from a Natural Experiment
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.
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| 6. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Sickness Absence and Local Benefit Cultures
- 2016
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Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - : Wiley. - 0347-0520 .- 1467-9442. ; 118:1, s. 49-78
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In many countries, sickness absence financed by generous insurance benefits is an important concern in the policy debate. There are strong variations in absence behavior among local geographical areas. Such variations are difficult to explain in terms of observable socioeconomic factors. In this paper, we investigate whether such variations are related to group effects in the form of social interaction among individuals within neighborhoods. Well-known methodological problems arise when trying to answer this question. A special feature of our efforts to deal with these problems is that we adopt several alternative approaches to identify group effects. Our study is based on a rich set of Swedish panel data, and we find indications of group effects in each of our approaches.
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| 7. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms in Social Insurance
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Political Economy. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0022-3808 .- 1537-534X. ; 126, s. s116-S139
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard, and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the information available to norm enforcers. This highlights one important aspect of norms, namely, that they may compensate for the insurer's limited information.
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| 8. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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The Gains from Pension Reform
- 2002
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We classify social security pension systems in three dimensions: actuarial versus non-actuarial, funded versus unfunded, and defined-benefit versus defined contribution systems. Recent pension reforms are discussed in terms of these dimensions. Shifting to a more actuarial system reduces labor-market distortions, although limiting the scope for redistribution. Shifting to a funded system may increase saving, redistribute income to future generations and distort contermporary labor supply. A partial shift to a funded system helps individuals diversify their pension assets. A shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution system means that income risk will be shifted from workers to pensioners.
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