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- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using eages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.
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- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Price Inertia and Production Lags
- 1991
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper shows how prolonged price inertia can arise in a macroeconomic system in which there are temporary price rigidities as well as production lags in the use of intermediate goods. In this context, changes in product demand - generated, say, by changes in the money supply - have long-lasting price and quantity effects. Specifically, a temporary demand shift generates "persistence" in price-quantity decision, in the sense that the price-quantity effects of this shift persist for long after the shift has dosappeared. A permanent demand shift generates "sluggishness" in price-quantity decisions, in the sense that the full price effects of the shift take a long time to appear and that meanwhile quantity effects are present.
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