| 1. |
- Olsson, Lars E., 1971, et al.
(författare)
-
Examining the Use of Subsidies for the Abatement of Greenhouse Gas Emissions through Experimental Simulations
- 2006
-
Ingår i: European Environment. ; , s. 184-197
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A market experiment was designed to empirically investigate the potential effectiveness of a governmental subsidy system to reduce sales and therefore production of environmentally harmful products. The important issue of whether the subsidy system preserves competitiveness was also examined. In the experiment two levels of a subsidy for unsold units were compared with no subsidy. To simulate the way in which subsidy levels may vary across time in real markets, the effects of high and low uncertainty regarding the subsidy level were also investigated. The results showed that subsidies, whether known and fixed or uncertain and varying, did not erode competition but nevertheless led to higher prices, which resulted in fewer sales. In the control condition a price war resulting in decreasing prices and increasing sales were observed. Several ways in which the proposed subsidy system may be implemented in the transport sector and other sectors are discussed. It is suggested that subsidies may make the adjustment process toward sustainable production less costly for the regulated parties.
|
|
| 2. |
- Olsson, Lars E., 1971, et al.
(författare)
-
Experimental simulations of a subsidy system for sustainable production
- 2005
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A multi-trial duopoly price-setting experiment was conducted to investigate the potential effectiveness of a governmental subsidy system aimed to reduce sales and therefore production of environmentally harmful products. Two levels of a subsidy for unsold units were compared with a control condition without a sub-sidy. The results showed that the subsidies did not erode competition but never-theless led to the setting of higher prices that resulted in fewer sales. In the con-trol condition a price-war led to decreasing prices and increasing sales. The ways in which the proposed subsidy system may be implemented in the transport sec-tor and other sectors are discussed. Specifically, it is proposed that the subsidy system may complement the newly introduced European Emission Trading Scheme.
|
|
| 3. |
- Olsson, Lars E., 1971, et al.
(författare)
-
Experimental tests of system of governmental subsidies for sustainable production.
- 2005
-
Ingår i: Paper presented at the 7th Nordic Environmental Social Science (NESS) research conference, Göteborg University, Sweden.
-
Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- A multi-trial duopoly price-setting game was used to investigate the potential ef-fectiveness of a governmental subsidy system to reduce sales and therefore pro-duction of environmentally harmful products. Two levels of a subsidy for unsold units were compared with a control condition without a subsidy. The results showed that the subsidies did not prevent competition but nevertheless led to the setting of higher prices that resulted in fewer sales. In the control condition a price war led to decreasing prices and increasing sales. The ways in which the proposed subsidy system may be implemented in the transport sector and other sectors are discussed. Specifically, it is proposed that the subsidy system may complement the newly introduced European Emission Trading Scheme
|
|
| 4. |
- Olsson, Lars E., 1971, et al.
(författare)
-
Subsidies for sustainable production: Effects of changing subsidy level
- 2005
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A multi-trial duopoly price-setting game was used to investigate the potential ef-fectiveness of a subsidy system aimed at reducing sales and thereby production of environmentally harmful products. In real life it is however likely that a subsidy level will never remain fixed, either nominally or in real value. Producers may also have unreliable perceptions of the subsidy level even if it does not change. Therefore, a subsidy, either fixed and known, varying randomly, or varying sys-tematically across trials, was investigated. The results showed that both fixed and known, as well as varying subsidy levels led to higher prices and thus re-duced sales compared to without a subsidy. Knowledge of a fixed subsidy level or expectations about a subsidy level based on previous trials, appeared to make participants refrain from setting lower prices than the subsidy level. Further-more, the results indicated that participants attempted to maximize their profit by selling to the lowest price, thus they stayed competitive and did not exploit the subsidy.
|
|
| 5. |
- Olsson, Lars E., 1971, et al.
(författare)
-
The dyadic subsidy game: Effects of uncertain and changing subsidies on price setting
- 2004
-
Ingår i: Poster presented at the 28th international congress of psychology, Beijing, China..
-
Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In order to reduce sales (production) of environmentally harmful products we investigate the effects of subsidies that compensate producers for what they do not sell. A repeated duopoly price-setting game with imperfect price competition was devised. The results show that higher subsidies led to reduced sales and, as a consequence, higher price, and that uncertainty regarding the size of the subsidy did not change this. Furthermore, competition was not eroded by introducing the subsidy. The results also indicate that the theoretical framework of dyadic price negotiation is applicable to the dyadic subsidy game. We conclude that such a subsidy system may be used as a regulating mechanism in order to reduce sales (and thereby production) of environmentally harmful products or as a tool to restrain the overharvesting of finite resources
|
|
