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- Lyles, Max, 1967
(författare)
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The Teleological Method of Statute Interpretation - An Enigma of the Uppsala School?
- 2003
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Ingår i: Law and politics - in search of balance : abstracts, special workshops and working groups : IVR 21st World congress Lund, Sweden, 12-18 august 2003. - Lund. - 9197473405
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- According to Axel Hägerström’s legal theory one of the foremost tasks of jurisprudence is to systematize, interpret, expound and comment the law for the benefit of the judge. By defining the task of jurisprudence in such a narrow manner Hägerström effectively denied that other areas of legal science than legal dogmatics were capable of constituting sources of law. Fields such as e.g. sociology of law, legal philosophy, legal politics, legal psychology and legal economics were thus considered to be incapable of producing legal knowledge having any direct practical utility and relevance to the judge, and they could consequently not be sources of law. One reason explaining why this had to be the case is that the judge, as an office holder, is bound to apply the law of the land first and foremost. To the judge all forms of legal knowledge (scientific or other) not taking the content of the law as its primary point of departure and the application of the law as its ultimate goal thus becomes theoretically secondary and practically superfluous with respect to legal knowledge which deals directly with the content of the legal sources. Taking this view of jurisprudence into consideration, the fact that Hägerström, Ross and Ekelöf all seemed to advance a teleological method of statutory interpretation, which is a method that allows other standards than the strictly legal to be introduced and used as interpretative data in the application of law, thus gives birth to an enigma; for how is it possible to combine this method of interpretation with the outspoken legal positivism of the Uppsala School? Is it possible to combine such a methodology with the dogmatic perspective inherent in the Uppsala School’s legal theory without giving birth to methodological inconsitencies? In my paper I shall discuss this dilemma and the possibility that the legal positivism of the Uppsala School is something else than strict positivism.
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