| 1. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(author)
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Millian Superiorities
- 2004
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In: Patterns of value : essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2 (LPR : Lund philosophy reports ; 2004:1). - 1404-3718.
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Abstract is not available.
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| 2. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(author)
-
Modeling Parity and Incomparability
- 2004
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In: Patterns of value : essays on formal axiology and value analysis. vol. 2 (LPR : Lund philosophy reports ; 2004:1 ). - 1404-3718.
-
Book chapter (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Abstract is not available.
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| 3. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(author)
-
On Millian Discontinuities
- 2003
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In: Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis. - 1404-3718. ; 1, s. 1-8
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Suppose one sets up a sequence of less-and-less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems to be that a radical gap cannot be scaled by a series of steps, if none of the steps itself is radical. We show that this picture is incorrect on a stronger interpretation of value superiority, but correct on a weaker one. Thus, the conclusion we reach is that, in some sense at least, abrupt breaks in such decreasing sequences cannot be avoided, but that such unavoidable breaks are less drastic than it has been suggested.
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| 4. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(author)
-
Superior Attributes
- 2004
-
In: Patterns of value : essays on formal axiology and value analysis. vol. 2. ( LPR : Lund philosophy reports ; 2004 :1 ). - 1404-3718.
-
Book chapter (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Abstract is not available.
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| 5. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
-
Better to be than not to be?
- 2012
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In: Discusiones Filosóficas. - 0124-6127. ; 13:21, s. 65-85
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Can it be better (or worse) for me to exist than not to exist? Several philosophers have denied this, on the ground that if it could, then if I didn't exist, this would have been worse (better) for me, which is absurd. In our paper we argue that these philosophers are mistaken: Claims about the comparative value or disvalue of existence need not imply any absurdities. Such claims, which are of central importance for population ethics and for the status of the so-called Person-Affecting Restriction, can be rationalized if one adheres to the so-called fitting-attitudes analysis of value.
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| 6. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
-
Better to Be than not to Be?
- 2010
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In: The Benefit of Broad Horizons. - Leiden : Brill Academic Publishers. - 9789004192843 ; , s. 399-414, s. 399-421
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)
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| 7. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
-
Millian Superiorities
- 2005
-
In: Utilitas. - 0953-8208 .- 1741-6183. ; 17:2, s. 127-146
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems to be that a radical gap cannot be scaled by a series of steps, if none of the steps itself is radical. We show that this picture is incorrect on a stronger interpretation of value superiority, but correct on a weaker one. Thus, the conclusion we reach is that, in some sense at least, abrupt breaks in such decreasing sequences cannot be avoided, but that such unavoidable breaks are less drastic than has been suggested. In an appendix written by John Broome and Wlodek Rabinowicz, the distinction between two kinds of value superiority is extended from objects to their attributes.
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| 8. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
-
The Value of Existence
- 2015
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In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 424-444
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
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| 9. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
-
Value and Unacceptable Risk : Temkin’s Worries about Continuity Reconsidered
- 2005
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In: Economics and Philosophy. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 21:2, s. 177-197
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult to determine what conclusions should be drawn from this result. Contrary to what Temkin suggests, substitutivity of equivalents is a notoriously controversial principle. But even in the absence of substitutivity, the counter-intuitive conclusion is derivable from a strengthened version of continuity for easy cases. The best move, therefore, might be to question the latter principle, even in its original simple version: as we argue, continuity for easy cases gives rise to a sorites.
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| 10. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
-
Value Superiority
- 2015
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In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 225-248
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
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