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- Johansson, Tobias, 1977, et al.
(författare)
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Explaining the utilization of relative performance evaluation in local government: A multi-theoretical study using data from Sweden
- 2009
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Ingår i: Financial Accountability & Management. - Oxford : Blackwell. - 0267-4424 .- 1468-0408. ; 25:2, s. 197-224
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the more lasting imprints that New Public Management (NPM) has made in the public sector is an increase in the popularity of performance measurement. In Sweden, performance measurement has gained popularity in the public sector, not least at the local government level with the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Because utilization of RPE is a decentralized and optional mode of governance, a somewhat heterogeneous practice has evolved. The aim of this paper is to examine the causes of this differentiated practice. We jointly examine economic, political and institutional/cultural explanations in order to account for the utilization of RPE. The empirical material consists of archival data and a questionnaire sent to all Swedish municipalities in late 2005. We show that RPE adoption and use partly has different antecedents and that the institutional/cultural perspective appears to have greater explanatory power than economic and political, not least as a consequence of the potential to explain decoupling and the importance of change facilitating capabilities. The investigation contributes specifically to the literature on the utilization of RPE in local governments and more generally to the literature on why and to what extent management accounting practices are utilized.
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| 2. |
- Johansson, Tobias, 1977-, et al.
(författare)
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Managing cooperation, coordination, and legitimacy : control of contracted public services
- 2016
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Ingår i: Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal. - : Emerald Group Publishing Limited. - 1368-0668 .- 1758-4205. ; 29:6, s. 1012-1037
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to create knowledge about what factors explain the design of control systems for contracted public services.Design/methodology/approach: Questionnaire data analyzed with structural equation models. Findings – Legitimacy-seeking is the most important driver in explaining intensity in control of contracted public services. Competition increases the intensity of control which is opposite to standard transaction cost reasoning. Coordination requirements do not affect the design of control systems for contracted public services.Research limitations/implications: The study suffers from limitations in the form of the use of perception and questionnaire data and imposes restrictions on empirical generalization. Practical implications: Supplier competition may add control costs rather than lower them. The strong focus on stakeholder alignment may induce more intensive control than necessary for supplier alignment.Originality/value: The authors add important knowledge on the determinants of control system design for contracted public sector services. The authors conceptualize and measure the control system in use in a more compelling manner than previous research.
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| 5. |
- Johansson, Tobias, Dr. Docent, 1977-, et al.
(författare)
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The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing
- 2018
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Ingår i: Financial Accountability and Management. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0267-4424 .- 1468-0408. ; 34:3, s. 268-287
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.
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| 6. |
- Johansson, Tobias, 1977-, et al.
(författare)
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Why is research on management accounting change not explicitly evolutionary? : Taking the next step in the conceptualisation of management accounting change
- 2009
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Ingår i: Management Accounting Research. - Amsterdam : Elsevier. - 1044-5005 .- 1096-1224. ; 20:2, s. 146-162
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article we discuss the evolutionary foundation of the OIE-guided management accounting change research building on the framework of [Scapens R.W. 1994. Never mind the gap: towards an institutional perspective on management accounting practice. Management Accounting Research, 5, 301–321.] and [Burns, J. and Scapens, R.W., 2000. Conceptualizing management accounting change: an institutional framework. Management Accounting Research, 11, 3–25.]. We argue that research on management accounting change should be based on evolutionary theory, but that the full potential of evolutionary theory has not yet been described or used in management accounting research. The conceptualisation and understanding of management accounting change can be improved and expanded if the evolutionary approach is developed beyond the general belief that it describes only small and gradual, often slow, changes. In this article we show that an evolutionary perspective on management accounting change implies that management accounting’s development is explained as the interaction between the evolutionary sub processes of retention (inheritance), variation and selection. Thus, both continuity and change are seen as evolutionary outcomes. These processes follow the cumulative causality that Charles Darwin proposed and Thorstein Veblen applied to the social sciences. Such a comprehensive theory, here labelled Universal Darwinism, must, however, be given substance with supporting details.
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