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- 2019
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal Environmental Road Pricing and Daily Commuting Patterns
- 2017
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Ingår i: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological. - : Elsevier BV. - 0191-2615. ; 105:November, s. 297-314
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Road pricing can improve air quality by reducing and spreading traffic flows. Nevertheless, air quality does not depend only on traffic flows, but also on pollution dispersion. In this paper we investigate the effects of the temporal variation in pollution dispersion on optimal road pricing, and show that time-varying road pricing is needed to make drivers internalize the social costs of both time-varying congestion and time-varying pollution. To this end, we develop an ecological economics model that takes into account the effects of road pricing on integrated daily commuting patterns. We characterize the optimal road pricing when pollution dispersion varies over the day and analyze its effects on traffic flows, arrival times, and the number of commuters by car.
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| 3. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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State-Dependent Enforcement to Foster the Adoption of New Technologies
- 2015
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Ingår i: Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 62:2, s. 359-381
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Harrington (J Public Econ 37:29–53, 1988) shows that a suitable strategy for regulators to make enforcement more efficient is to target surveillance resources according to past compliance records. Such scheme generates enforcement leverage as non-compliance triggers greater future scrutiny increasing the expected costs of non-compliance beyond the avoidance of immediate fines. In this paper, we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework, in which targeting is based not only on firms’ past compliance record but also on adoption of environmentally superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption of new technology but also increase deterrence by changing the composition of firms in the industry toward an increased fraction of cleaner firms that pollute and violate less.
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| 4. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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The Harrington Paradox Squared
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Harrington (1988) shows that state-dependent enforcement based on past compliance records provides an explanation to the seemingly contradictory observation that firms' compliance with environmental regulations is high despite the fact that inspections occur infrequently and fines are rare and small. This result has been labeled in the literature as the "Harrington paradox". In this paper we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework where targeting is based not only on firms' past compliance record but also on adoption of environmentally superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption of new technology but also increase deterrence by changing the composition of firms in the industry toward an increased fraction of cleaner firms that pollute and violate less.
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- Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 1985
(författare)
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Cooperation and paradoxes in climate economics
- 2015
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Paper I: Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing: The Role of Innovation. This paper uses a dynamic game to investigate the strategic interactions between carbon taxation by a coalition of resource consumers and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers’ cartel under the possibility of innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology. The timing of innovation is uncertain, but can be affected by the amount spent on R&D. The results show that the expectation of possible innovation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher initial resource extraction and carbon emissions. Though this ‘green paradox’ effect triggered by possible innovation also will appear in the cooperative case (without strategic interactions), the presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can somewhat restrain such an effect. For both the resource consumers and a global planner, the optimal R&D to stimulate innovation is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration. However, the resource consumers can over-invest in R&D relative to the investment level that a global planner would choose. Paper II: The Harrington Paradox Squared. Harrington (1988) shows that state-dependent enforcement based on past compliance records provides an explanation to the seemingly contradictory observation that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is high despite the fact that inspections occur infrequently and fines are rare and small. This result has been labeled in the literature as the “Harrington paradox.” In this paper, we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework, in which targeting is based not only on firms’ past compliance record but also on adoption of environ- mentally superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption of new technology but also increase deterrence by changing the composition of firms in the industry toward an increased fraction of cleaner firms that pollute and violate less. Paper III: The Benefits of International Cooperation under Climate Uncertainty: A Dynamic Game Analysis. This paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players' combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.
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| 6. |
- Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 1985, et al.
(författare)
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Household fuel choice in urban China: A random effect generalized probit analysis
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Using seven rounds of household survey data that span more than a decade, this paper analyzes the determinants of household fuel choice in urban China. Unlike the existing studies, we use an empirical strategy that takes into account the potential heterogeneous effects of socio-economic factors in households’ preference ordering. Robustness of this empirical strategy is checked against alternative methods. The results show that household fuel choice in urban China is related to fuel prices, household’s economic status and size, and household head’s gender, education and occupation. Our results suggest that policies and interventions that raise household income, reduce prices of clean fuel sources, and empower women in the household are of great significance in encouraging the adoption of clean energy sources.
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| 7. |
- Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 1985
(författare)
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Optimal strategic oil stockpiling and import tariffs: The case of China
- 2014
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Ingår i: Energy Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0140-9883. ; 45, s. 463-474
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- As two of the most important instruments for dealing with the issues of energy supply security, strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) and oil import tariffs have been proven effective in developed countries. While China is currently building up its strategic oil reserves to ensure energy security, it is of great importance to investigate China's optimal oil stockpiling policies while taking into account the possibility of imposing an import tariff or quota, which can also be used for alleviating the energy insecurity of an oil-importing country. Employing a dynamic programming framework, this paper examines the optimal SPR policies and oil import tariffs or quotas for China and the interactions between the two instruments under different scenarios for the world oil market. The results show that the combination of optimal tariffs and SPR policies can substantially reduce the expected oil insecurity cost for China; the effect is larger when the probability that a disruption will continue is higher.
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| 8. |
- Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 1985
(författare)
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Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing: The role of Innovation
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper investigates the strategic interactions between carbon taxation by a resource-consumers’ coalition and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers’ cartel under possible innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology through a dynamic game. The arrival time of innovation is uncertain, but can be affected by the amount spent on R&D. The results show that the expectation of possible innovation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher initial resource extraction or carbon emissions. Even though this ’green paradox’ effect will appear in the cooperative case (no strategic interactions) as well, the presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can somewhat restrain such an effect. The optimal R&D to stimulate innovation is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration for both the resource consumersand a global planner. However, the resource consumers can over-invest in R&D (compared with the global efficient investment).
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