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1.
  • Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al. (författare)
  • Comepting Wage Claims, Cost Inflation, and Capacity Utilization
  • 1982
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • This paper develops a theory of competing wage claims and cost inflation, and attempts to integrate this theory into the core of modern macroeconomic analysis. Specifically, the paper proposes an explanation for wage rigidity and wage interdependence based on an application of duopoly theory to labor union behavior into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with goods, money, and bonds as well as two kinds of labor. Special emphasis is placed on the interplay between demand and cost factors in the inflation process and on the implications of wage competition among labor unions for the relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run.
2.
  • Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al. (författare)
  • Money, Exchange Rates, Wages, and Games
  • 1987
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • This paper is focused on the interaction of monetary policy and wage determination in open economies with strong labor unions. Applying some elements of game theory, the paper views both government and labor as endogenous utility maximizers, and studies the macroeconomic consequences af their interaction. In particular, the paper shows (a) how labor unions adjust wages optimally to prices following monetary expansion or devaluation; (b) how the ultimate effectiveness of policy is reduced (without necessarily being destroyed) by optimal union reactions; and (c) how the interplay of government and labor can create a persistent tendency to unemployment and inflation simultaneously.
3.
  • Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al. (författare)
  • The Macroeconomic Consequences of Endogenous Governments and Labor Unions
  • 1982
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between government spending, wages, employment, and prices under different assumptions about the behavior patterns of governments and labor unions.For this purpose, we analyze the interaction between utility-maximizing labor unions and welfare- (or vote-) maximizing government from a game-theoretic point of view within a fairly general macroeconomic framework. Within this framework, both labor unions and the government are assumed to maximize objective functions subject to constraints imposed by the macroeconomic environment. Rational behavior requires each to react to changes in the behavior of the other. The aim of studying the process by which unions react and counterreact to government behavior and vice versa is to attempt to shed new light on the apaprently persistent inflationary bias of the economies of the industrial countries, the gradual increase in the size of the public sector of these countries over the years, and the role that changes in the preferences and the "world view" of governments, as well as in the political and economic strength of labor unions, have played in these developments.
4.
  • Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al. (författare)
  • Wage Rigidity and Wage Rivalry
  • 1982
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • The aim of this paper is to present a theory of wages based on an application of oligopoly theory to labor unions, and to use this theory to explain why nominal wage rigidity in the short run does not necessarily imply money illusion or other forms of irrational behavior. Specifically, the paper shows formally that if workers are concerned about relative wages, rational behavior does not require them to demand full compensation for all price increases unless they expect all other workers to be fully compensated.
5.
  • Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al. (författare)
  • Wages, Money, and Exchange Rates
  • 1986
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • This paper analyzes the role and macroeconomic impact of monetary and exchange rate policy as well as of wage formation in open economies where wages are primarily determined through collective bargaining among powerful labor unions and relatively weak employers. Applying some elements of game theory, the paper treats the government and unions as endogenous, and explores the macroeconomic consequences of their interaction. In particular, the paper argues, and demonstrates by numerical examples, that the ultimate effects of monetary expansion or devaluation (as well as of exogenous wage hikes) on incomes and prices depend cricually in the reaction patterns of both unions and government.
6.
  • Hassler, John, et al. (författare)
  • Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Stability and Optimality of Alternative Pension Systems
  • 1997
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • In an analysis of the risk-sharing properties of different types of pension systems, we show that only a fixed-fee pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems can provide intergenerational risk sharing for living individuals. Under some circumstances, however, other PAYG pensions systems can enhance the expected welfare of all generations by reducing intergenerational income variability. We derive conditions for this to occur. We also analyze the stability of actuarially far PAYG pensions systems. It is shown that if an actuarially fair pension with a non-balanced budget system is dynamically stable, its accumulated surpluses will converge to the same fund as in a fully funded system. We also show that the welfare loss due to labor market distortions will, surprisingly, increase if the implicit marginal return in a compulsory system raised above the average return.
7.
  • Hassler, John, et al. (författare)
  • Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems
  • 1996
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • A rationale for a compulsory pension system is that the government wants to correct supposedly myopic behavior by the individuals. Given such a system, we calculate the optimal relation between marginal contributions and benefits, i.e., the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness, for the individuals or for the government. We show that the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness increases in the rate of return in the social security system and also decreases in the government's rate of time preference. It is also shown that labor supple always increases when the link between marginal contributions and benefits is strengthened.
8.
  • Lindbeck, Assar, et al. (författare)
  • A Continuous Model of Income Insurance
  • 2008
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • We develop a simple yet realistic model of income insurance, where the individual’s ability and willingness to work is treated as a continuous variable. In this framework, income insurance not only provides income smoothing, it also relieves the individual from particularly burdensome work. As a result, the individual adjusts his labor supply in a continuous fashion to the implicit tax wedge of the insurance system. Moral hazard, in the sense that an individual receives insurance benefits without actually being fully qualified, also becomes a matter of degree. Moreover, our continuous framework makes it easy to analyze both the role of administrative rejection of claims, and the role of social norms, for the utilization of insurance.
9.
  • Lindbeck, Assar, et al. (författare)
  • A Continuous Model of Income Insurance
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: International Tax and Public Finance. - 0927-5940. ; 20:6, s. 938-960
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • In this paper we treat an individual's health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is assumed that the individual is either able or unable to work. A continuous treatment of an individual's health sheds new light on the role of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in the traditional, dichotomous models. In particular, we show that moral hazard is not necessarily outright fraud, but a gradual adjustment of the willingness to work, depending on preferences and the conditions stated in the insurance contract. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims, and it clarifies the conditions for the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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10.
  • Lindbeck, Assar, et al. (författare)
  • A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance
  • 2010
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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