| 1. |
- Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, et al.
(författare)
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Why Are Market Economies Politically Stable? A Theory of Capitalist Cohesion
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The present paper documents that political stability is positively associated with the extent of domestic trade. In explaining this reg- ularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market ex- change, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the prefer- ences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that en- hance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization become su¢ ciently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non- cooperative under self-sufficiency, the political decision making process becomes cooperative in the market economy, as the welfare of individ- uals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods.
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| 2. |
- Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, et al.
(författare)
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Windfall Gains, Political Economy, and Economic Development
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Natural resource rents and foreign aid have the character of windfall gains that affect economic outcomes both directly and indirectly. Several studies have shown that the indirect effect typically works via institutions like corruption. In this article, we offer a theoretical framework for a joint analysis of how natural resources and aid potentially affect total output in society through rent seeking activities. We survey the existing evidence on both direct and indirect effects of windfalls and provide some new empirical evidence of the association between aid/natural resources and institutions in a large cross-section of countries. Our results suggest that whereas more aid means less corruption, natural resource rents is positively correlated with corruption, although both relationships are nonlinear.
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| 3. |
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