| 1. |
- Cownden, Daniel, et al.
(författare)
-
A popular misapplication of evolutionary modeling to the study of human cooperation
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Evolution and human behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 1090-5138 .- 1879-0607. ; 38:3, s. 421-427
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- To examine the evolutionary basis of a behavior, an established approach (known as the phenotypic gambit) is to assume that the behavior is controlled by a single allele, the fitness effects of which are derived from a consideration of how the behavior interacts, via life-history, with other ecological factors. Here we contrast successful applications of this approach with several examples of an influential and superficially similar line of research on the evolutionary basis of human cooperation. A key difference is identified: in the latter line of research the focal behavior, cooperation, is abstractly defined in terms of immediate fitness costs and benefits. Selection is then assumed to act on strategies in an iterated social context for which fitness effects can be derived by aggregation of the abstractly defined immediate fitness effects over a lifetime. This approach creates a closed theoretical loop, rendering models incapable of making predictions or providing insight into the origin of human cooperation. We conclude with a discussion of how evolutionary approaches might be appropriately used in the study of human social behavior.
|
|
| 2. |
- Cownden, Daniel, et al.
(författare)
-
The implications of learning across perceptually and strategically distinct situations
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 195:2, s. 511-528
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Game theory is a formal approach to behavior that focuses on the strategic aspect of situations. The game theoretic approach originates in economics but has been embraced by scholars across disciplines, including many philosophers and biologists. This approach has an important weakness: the strategic aspect of a situation, which is its defining quality in game theory, is often not its most salient quality in human (or animal) cognition. Evidence from a wide range of experiments highlights this shortcoming. Previous theoretical and empirical work has sought to address this weakness by considering learning across an ensemble of multiple games simultaneously. Here we extend this framework, incorporating artificial neural networks, to allow for an investigation of the interaction between the perceptual and functional similarity of the games composing the larger ensemble. Using this framework, we conduct a theoretical investigation of a population that encounters both stag hunts and prisoner’s dilemmas, two situations that are strategically different but which may or may not be perceptually similar.
|
|
| 3. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
-
A Below-Average Effect with Respect to American Political Stereotypes on Warmth and Competence
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Political Psychology. - : Wiley. - 0162-895X .- 1467-9221. ; 36:3, s. 341-350
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The "above-average effect" is the phenomenon that people tend to judge themselves above average on desirable traits. Based on social identity theory, we propose that a "below-average effect" may arise when individuals rate themselves and the average ingroup member on traits stereotypically associated with the ingroup. In two studies, Republican and Democrat participants rated themselves and the average political ingroup member on possession of desirable traits related to warmth and competence. Current political stereotypes in America associate the former dimension with Democrats and the latter with Republicans. Consistent with our hypothesis, the above-average effect was moderated by political group and dimension in interaction. In particular, Democrats rated themselves below the average Democrat on warmth and Republicans rated themselves below the average Republican on competence.
|
|
| 4. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
-
A New Look at Individual Differences in Perceptions of Unfairness : The Theory of Maximally Unfair Allocations in Multiparty Situations
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Social Justice Research. - New York : Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. - 0885-7466 .- 1573-6725. ; 28:4, s. 401-414
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Previous research has demonstrated that unfairness judgments of resource allocations become more complex when there are more than two recipients. In order to explain some of this complexity, we propose a set of psychological mechanisms that may underlie four different choices of maximally unfair resource allocations (MUA): Self-Single-Loser, Self-One-Loser-of-Many, Self-Single-Winner, and Self-One-Winner-of-Many. From this psychological theory, several predictions are derived and tested in vignette studies involving a total of 708 participants recruited online using MTurk. As predicted by our theory, (1) choices of MUA where there is a single loser were much more common when the allocated resource was of negative rather than positive valence, and (2) the amount of egoistic bias individuals exhibited when judging the unfairness in receiving a small rather than a large share in a non-extreme multi-party allocation was predicted by their choices of MUA. These findings suggest that an individual’s choice of MUA reveals some generally relevant principles of how unfairness is perceived in multi-party allocations. This opens up new lines of inquiry, especially regarding research on social dilemmas and social value orientation.
|
|
| 5. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
An Exponential Limit Shape of Random q-proportion Bulgarian Solitaire
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Integers. - 1553-1732. ; 18
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We introduce pn-random qn-proportion Bulgarian solitaire (0 < pn, qn ≤ 1), playedon n cards distributed in piles. In each pile, a number of cards equal to the propor-tion qn of the pile size rounded upward to the nearest integer are candidates to bepicked. Each candidate card is picked with probability pn, independently of othercandidate cards. This generalizes Popov’s random Bulgarian solitaire, in whichthere is a single candidate card in each pile. Popov showed that a triangular limitshape is obtained for a fixed p as n tends to infinity. Here we let both pn and qnvary with n. We show that under the conditions q2npnn/log n → ∞ and pnqn → 0 asn → ∞, the pn-random qn-proportion Bulgarian solitaire has an exponential limitshape.
|
|
| 6. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
-
Bidirectional associations between descriptive and injunctive norms
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. - : Elsevier BV. - 0749-5978 .- 1095-9920. ; 129, s. 59-69
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Modern research on social norms makes an important distinction between descriptive norms (how people commonly behave) and injunctive norms (what one is morally obligated to do). Here we propose that this distinction is far from clear in the cognition of social norms. In a first study, using the implicit association test, the concepts of common and moral were found to be strongly associated. Some implications of this automatic common-moral association were investigated in a subsequent series of experiments: Our participants tended to make explicit inferences from descriptive norms to injunctive norms and vice versa; they tended to mix up descriptive and injunctive concepts in recall tasks; and frequency information influenced participants' own moral judgments. We conclude by discussing how the common-moral association could play a role in the dynamics of social norms.
|
|
| 7. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-
(författare)
-
Comment on “The Evolution of Cultural Complexity : Not by the Treadmill Alone” by Andersson & Read
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Current Anthropology. - 0011-3204 .- 1537-5382. ; 57, s. 275-276
-
Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- At the end of their thoughtful target article, Andersson and Read conclude that formal models of cultural evolution are “useful but must be kept in perspective.” As a mathematician with a great interest in social science, I have some experience of working with such models. Based on this experience, I very much agree with the “but” part of the above conclusion. I see a clear tendency in the cultural evolution literature to put too much trust in the value of formal models.
|
|
| 8. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
-
Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0022-1031 .- 1096-0465. ; 69, s. 59-64
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The ultimatum game is a common economic experiment in which some participants reject another's unfair offer of how to split some money, even though it leaves them both worse off. This costly behavior can be seen as enforcement of a fairness norm and has been labeled “altruistic punishment”, suggesting that it is a moral thing to do. But is this behavior viewed as moral by participants? Is it viewed as punishment? And are the payoff consequences of the behavior sufficient to determine the answers to these questions? To investigate this we framed costly punishment in two different ways: either as rejection of an offer (the standard ultimatum game framing) or as reduction of payoff. In a series of paid and hypothetical experiments we found that moral concerns about costly punishment depended on the framing. Specifically, the reduction frame elicited more moral concern about, and less use of, costly punishment than did the rejection frame. Several implications are discussed.
|
|
| 9. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
-
Cross-Cultural Differences in Emotional Selection on Transmission of Information
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Journal of Cognition and Culture. - : Brill. - 1567-7095 .- 1568-5373. ; 16:1-2, s. 122-143
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Research on cultural transmission among Americans has established a bias for transmitting stories that have disgusting elements (such as exposure to rats and maggots). Conceived of as a cultural evolutionary force, this phenomenon is one type of emotional selection. In a series of online studies with Americans and Indians we investigate whether there are cultural differences in emotional selection, such that the transmission process favours different kinds of content in different countries. The first study found a bias for disgusting content (rats and maggots) among Americans but not among Indians. Four subsequent studies focused on how country interacts with kind of emotional content (disgusting vs. happy surprises and good news) in reactions to transmission of stories or information. Whereas Indian participants, compared to Americans, tended to be less interested in, and excited by, transmission of stories and news involving common disgust-elicitors (like rats), the opposite pattern held for transmission of happy surprises and good news (e.g., the opening of a new public facility). We discuss various possible explanations and implications.
|
|
| 10. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
-
Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Management and Organization Review. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1740-8776 .- 1740-8784. ; 13:4, s. 851-870
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Violators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.
|
|
