| 1. |
- Doukas, John, et al.
(författare)
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Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations
- 2002
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Ingår i: European Financial Management. - 1354-7798. ; 8:3, s. 281-314
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder’s investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Heaney, Richard, et al.
(författare)
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The Cost of Corporate Control : The Case of Billabong International
- 2004
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Ingår i: Accounting Research Journal. ; 17, s. 113-120
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose a framework for determining the cost associated with achieving corporate control for the controlling shareholder. In order to gain control of a company the controlling shareholder must reduce the level of diversification of their investment portfolio and it is the value to the shareholder of this reduction in the level of diversification that we focus on. We argue that it provides an estimate of the cost of control. We assume that the controlling shareholder’s portfolio consists of the controlling investment in the company with the remaining wealth invested in a utility maximising combination of the market portfolio and the risk free asset. We apply this valuation approach to a well known Australian company using publicly available information and we find that the cost of poor diversification is substantial and that it varies with investment horizon and level of risk aversion.
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| 4. |
- Holmén, Martin, et al.
(författare)
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A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings
- 2004
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Ingår i: Journal of Financial Intermediation. - : Elsevier BV. ; 13:3, s. 324-358
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Do families keep control of their firms because they, operating in an environment with weak protection of minority shareholders, fear being exploited by management after the IPO? Or is ownership concentration due to the value families attach to control? We find a positive relation between use of security designs that separate votes from capital and frequency of family-controlled firms in Sweden and other countries. It is not caused by differences in legal regimes or in minority protection. Since control blocks are never sold piecemeal to preserve control value, ownership remains highly concentrated. Family-controlled firms trade at a discount because of the misallocation of control rights to heirs who make inefficient decisions, not because of extraction of pecuniary benefits.
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| 5. |
- Holmén, Martin, et al.
(författare)
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Minority Shareholder Protection and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers
- 2004
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Ingår i: Journal of Finanical and Quantitative Analysis. - 0022-1090. ; 39:1, s. 167-191
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual class shares and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden’s extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish Mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden’s extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.
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