| 1. |
- Hassler, John, et al.
(författare)
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Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Stability and Optimality of Alternative Pension Systems
- 1997
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In an analysis of the risk-sharing properties of different types of pension systems, we show that only a fixed-fee pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems can provide intergenerational risk sharing for living individuals. Under some circumstances, however, other PAYG pensions systems can enhance the expected welfare of all generations by reducing intergenerational income variability. We derive conditions for this to occur. We also analyze the stability of actuarially far PAYG pensions systems. It is shown that if an actuarially fair pension with a non-balanced budget system is dynamically stable, its accumulated surpluses will converge to the same fund as in a fully funded system. We also show that the welfare loss due to labor market distortions will, surprisingly, increase if the implicit marginal return in a compulsory system raised above the average return.
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| 2. |
- Hassler, John, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A rationale for a compulsory pension system is that the government wants to correct supposedly myopic behavior by the individuals. Given such a system, we calculate the optimal relation between marginal contributions and benefits, i.e., the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness, for the individuals or for the government. We show that the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness increases in the rate of return in the social security system and also decreases in the government's rate of time preference. It is also shown that labor supple always increases when the link between marginal contributions and benefits is strengthened.
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| 3. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using eages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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ICT and Household-Firm Relations
- 1999
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper discusses how ICT and emerging electronic commerce in consumer products influence the relative efficiency in production of households and firms, resulting in changes in the division of tasks between these two types of agents. Increased information and competence of households, in combination with stiffer competition among firms, will also increase the power of households relative to firms, at least in a long-term perspective with free entry firms. Households will also get more powerful channels to influence firms directly, i.e., beside the indirect influence via market transactions. We point out that this will result in various counter-reactions by firms, including increased differentiation of products and prices. Finally, we briefly consider various limitations and obstacles to electronic commerce in a long-term perspective.
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| 6. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behaviour
- 1997
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In a broad psychological perspective, both economic incentives and social norms may be regarded as giving rise to purposeful, or "rational" behavior. By this I simply mean that individuals act in accordance with expected reward or punishment, even though the form these take differs substantially in the two cases. Whereas economic incentives imply "material rewards", or favors that can be traded for such rewards including leisure, social norms imply "social rewards". The latter basically take the form of approval or disapproval from others and related feelings of pride or shame. Moreover, once a social norm has been internalized in an individual's own value system, behavior in accordance with, or against, the norm will also result in feelings of self-respect or guilt. All this suggests that not only economic incentives but also social norms may be analyzed by means of utility theory, as will be illustrated below. Many social norms may not have much to do with economic incentives (Elster, 1989). In some cases, it is, however, useful to study the interaction between them. Indeed, this is the basic message of the paper. My discussion to three norms of apparent importance for household behavior: (i) work norms; (ii) norms against wage underbidding; and (iii) saving and consumption norms. Thus, the paper deals with norms concering willingness to work, ability to get a job and the use of income.
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| 7. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Incentives in the Welfare-State : Lessons for would-be welfare states
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper deals with economic incentives and welfare-state arrangements in OECD countries; it also offers some lessons for would-be welfare states. These arrangements differ, of course, among OECD countries. In particular, there is wide variation in the extent to which countries rely on four basic institutions - the state, the firm, the family and the market. Countries also differ in their reliance on (i) a common safety net, often in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to specific contingencies; (ii) means-tested benefits for low-income groups; and (iii) income protection, i.e., benefits that are tied to previous income. Another distinction between corporatist welfare states, where benefits are tied to labor contracts, and universal welfare states in which benefits are conditional on residence or citizenship. This distinction is blurred, however, by recent tendencies in corporatist welfare states to extend coverage to individuals who have very weak attachment to the labor market, and in universal welfare states to tie benefits to previous or contemporary work under the slogan "workfare" rather than "welfare".The degree of generosity of benefits is another important distinction. Of course, the lower the benefit levels, the stronger the incentives for citizens to opt for voluntary (market) solutions, in the form of private saving and private insurance arrangements.When considering incentive problems in connection with various types of welfare-state arrangements, this paper emphasizes what may be called "dynamic" issues, i.e., incentive effects that evolve over time. These also include endogenous changes in social norms among individuals and endogenous adjustments in political behavior. This approach also makes it necessary to broaden the analysis to fields outside conventionally defined "economic analysis".
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Options for Economic and Political Reform in Sweden
- 1993
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper summarises an official report to the Swedish government (and general public). The economic crisis in Sweden is explained by both system failures and specific policy mistakes. The system failures include distorted incentives and markets, and inappropriate and outdated institutions. The deep recession and extraordinary rise in unemployment started as a collision between inflationary wage development and attempts to pursue a hard-currency policy. The resulting loss of international competitiveness in the tradable sector was accompanied by increased real interest rates, collapsing real estate prices and a related financial crisis. Following the floating of the Swedish krona in November 1992, the main problem became a domestic demand collapse, which has been accentuated by a spectacular rise in the household saving rate. The report emphasizes that good policy advice is not enough; it is also necessary to analyse and reform not only to macroeconomic stability but also economic efficiency and growth. The proposed institutional reforms are designed to restore a highly competitive market system and to facilitate a responsible fiscal stabilisation programme. This would also enahnce the medium-run credibility for government policies and provide scope for a more expansionary policy in the short run.
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