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- Cäker, Mikael, 1972, et al.
(författare)
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Management control in public sector Joint Ventures
- 2011
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Ingår i: Management Accounting Research. - : Elsevier BV. - 1044-5005 .- 1096-1224. ; 22:4, s. 330-348
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cooperation among public sector organizations (PSOs) is increasingly important in the management of resources in welfare systems. A Joint Venture (JV) is an organization form that enables PSOs to cooperate with each other in order to achieve economies of scale. However, JVs contain interrelated horizontal and vertical control relationships (between the owners and between the owners and the JV Company) that complicate their control. The first aim of this paper is to map the dynamics in vertical and horizontal control packages in municipal JVs and to describe the relational factors that affect them. Based on three case studies we conclude that vertical control packages are affected by: goodwill trust and competence trust; parent differences in management style and size in combination with control competence; parent diversification (low relatedness between the JV's activity and the parents’ other activities); and the horizontal control package (e.g., rules for parent interaction and distribution of work). Horizontal control packages are affected by: goodwill trust, system trust and calculative trust; parent differences in size; and efforts to achieve equality. The second aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussion on the relationship between trust and control. We observed that trust is potentially unaffected by the introduction of formal controls. We also found that trust has an inverted “crowding out” effect on control. A high ambition to maintain trust leads to underdeveloped formal controls. In addition, we found that the ambition to preserve trust may inhibit the realisation of economies of scale.
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| 2. |
- Cäker, Mikael, 1972, et al.
(författare)
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Management control in public sector Joint Ventures
- 2010
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Ingår i: 33rd annual EAA congress, 19-21 May 2010, Istanbul Turkey.
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cooperation among public sector organizations is increasingly important in the management of resources in welfare systems. A Joint Venture (JV) is an organization form that enables public sector organizations to cooperate with others in order to achieve economies of scale in investments in physical resources and knowledge. However, our understanding of how this organization form is controlled is limited. This paper maps the control packages Swedish municipal JVs use in their horizontal and vertical relationships and investigates the factors that affect their control packages designs. The paper also contributes to the debate on the relationship between trust and control in inter-organizational relationships. The three case studies of this research reveal that vertical control packages are affected by trust, parents’ dissimilarities, the relatedness between the JV activity and other owner activities, and horizontal controls. Horizontal control packages are affected by the presence or absence of a dominant owner and by contacts between parents. Furthermore, the paper presents evidence of an “inverted crowding out” effect where maintaining trust is an argument for not developing formal controls. This effect may lead to instability in times of crisis and an inefficient use of resources. Keywords: Trust and control, horizontal control package, vertical control package, joint venture, public organizations, municipality
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| 5. |
- Kastberg, Gustaf, et al.
(författare)
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The design and use of management accounting systems in process oriented health care : an explorative study
- 2013
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Ingår i: Financial Accountability and Management. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0267-4424 .- 1468-0408. ; 29:3, s. 246-270
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Process orientation has made its entrance in Health Care Organizations (HCOs). The purpose is to improve patients’ journeys through the health care system. One factor that potentially affects process orientation is the design and use of Management Accounting Systems (MAS). In the literature there are worries that process orientation often is not supported by a well designed and used MAS but, on the contrary, is counteracted by a MAS designed for other purposes than supporting processes. This study contributes to the existing knowledge in that it shows how the introduction of process orientation within health care is accompanied by the development of horizontally oriented MAS (HMAS) which is used in different ways and by different actors. Generally, the use of HMAS for diagnostic control is limited. The main use of HMAS is for the purpose of mastering the events and interactive control, and the main users are the persons connected to the processes. The observation in earlier research that the existence of vertically oriented MAS may be a threat to process orientation is to some extent corroborated in the paper.
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| 10. |
- Siverbo, Sven, 1970-
(författare)
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The implementation and use of benchmarking in local government : A case study of the translation of a management accounting innovation
- 2014
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Ingår i: Financial Accountability and Management. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0267-4424 .- 1468-0408. ; 30:2, s. 121-149
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Benchmarking is a management accounting innovation (MAI) that can be used for performance measurement and management in both the private and the public sectors. Although public sector accounting researchers have reported some success with the use of benchmarking, it is frequently charged problems exist in implementing and using this management technique. To look beyond the technical and institutional explanations, this paper takes a translation approach and presents a case study of a local government benchmarking network. We conclude that there is a link between benchmarking implementation problems and initiators’ failure to build a strong network of benchmarking allies. Implementation is facilitated if actors other than the initiators recognize the possibility of making benchmarking more relevant and less cost focused. However, even when a network of actors has a favourable attitude towards benchmarking, benchmarking may still appear as an unruly ‘actant’. Furthermore, the perception of implementation failure and success is heterogeneous and connected to various actors’ adoption of benchmarking. We also conclude that there is a connection between the use of benchmarking and 1) actors’ possibilities to use benchmarking in the struggle for resources and 2) the perception of benchmarking information as ‘factual’ or ‘factual enough’. However, the perception of benchmarking information as ‘factual’ or ‘factual enough’ seems not only a matter of correct or incorrect ratios but also of whether such information serves actors’ interests. A final conclusion is that the use of benchmarking increases when actors other than the initiators complement the original idea and ‘counter interest’ the initiators.
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