| 1. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(författare)
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Millian Superiorities
- 2004
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Ingår i: Patterns of value : essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2 (LPR : Lund philosophy reports ; 2004:1). - 1404-3718.
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Abstract is not available.
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| 2. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(författare)
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Modeling Parity and Incomparability
- 2004
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Ingår i: Patterns of value : essays on formal axiology and value analysis. vol. 2 (LPR : Lund philosophy reports ; 2004:1 ). - 1404-3718.
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Abstract is not available.
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| 3. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(författare)
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On Millian Discontinuities
- 2003
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Ingår i: Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis. - 1404-3718. ; 1, s. 1-8
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Suppose one sets up a sequence of less-and-less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems to be that a radical gap cannot be scaled by a series of steps, if none of the steps itself is radical. We show that this picture is incorrect on a stronger interpretation of value superiority, but correct on a weaker one. Thus, the conclusion we reach is that, in some sense at least, abrupt breaks in such decreasing sequences cannot be avoided, but that such unavoidable breaks are less drastic than it has been suggested.
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| 4. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(författare)
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Superior Attributes
- 2004
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Ingår i: Patterns of value : essays on formal axiology and value analysis. vol. 2. ( LPR : Lund philosophy reports ; 2004 :1 ). - 1404-3718.
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Abstract is not available.
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| 5. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979, et al.
(författare)
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A Simpler, More Compelling Money Pump with Foresight
- 2020
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Ingår i: The Journal of Philosophy. - : Philosophy Documentation Center. - 0022-362X .- 1939-8549. ; 117:10, s. 578-589
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One might think that money pumps directed at agents with cyclic preferences can be avoided by foresight. This view was challenged two decades ago by the discovery of a money pump with foresight, which works against agents who use backward induction. But backward induction implausibly assumes that the agent would act rationally and retain her trust in her future rationality even at choice nodes that could only be reached if she were to act irrationally. This worry, however, does not apply to BI-terminating decision problems, where at each choice node backward induction prescribes a move that terminates further action. For BI-terminating decision problems, it is enough to assume that rationality and trust in rationality are retained at choice nodes reachable by rational moves. The old money pump with foresight was not BI-terminating. In this paper, we present a new money pump with foresight-one that is both BI-terminating and considerably simpler.
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| 6. |
- Risberg, Olle, 1993-
(författare)
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Guiding Concepts : Essays on Normative Concepts, Knowledge, and Deliberation
- 2020
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis addresses a range of questions about normativity, broadly understood. Recurring themes include (i) the idea of normative ‘action-guidance’, and the connection between normativity and motivational states, (ii) the possibility of normative knowledge and its role in deliberation, and (iii) the question of whether (and if so, how) normative concepts can themselves be evaluated.The first two papers, ‘The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy’ and ‘Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder’, critically examine various versions of the view that what we ought to do depends on some (actual or hypothetical) motivational states, such as desires. It is suggested that such views are, for different but interrelated reasons, extensionally inadequate.The third paper, ‘From Evolutionary Theory to Moral Skepticism, via Disagreement’ (co- authored with Folke Tersman), proposes that two arguments for moral skepticism can be combined in a mutually supportive way. A central role is played by the principle that a subject S knows that p only if S adherently believes that p, where this roughly means that S could not easily have failed to believe that p unless her epistemic position were worse or p were false. It is suggested that evolutionary considerations and facts about moral disagreement together indicate that moral beliefs violate this principle.The fourth paper, ‘Ethics and the Question of What to Do’, offers an account of the so- called ‘central deliberative question’ that is highlighted by several kinds of choice situations, including those that involve normative uncertainty and normative conflicts. It is proposed that this question is not best understood as the question of what one ought to do, not even in an ‘all things considered’ sense, but as the question of what to do. A meta-normative view that involves elements of both cognitivism and non-cognitivism is put forward as the best explanation of this fact.The fifth paper, ‘Meta-Skepticism’, develops a novel skeptical challenge to beliefs about the external world, the central idea being that even if beliefs about the external world can constitute knowledge, there are various other knowledge-like concepts that they cannot satisfy even if they are true. This raises the question of whether some of these concepts are epistemically more important than the others, and, in particular, the further question of how the relevant notion of ‘epistemic importance’ should be understood. Several answers to this question are considered and found wanting.
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| 7. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Better to be than not to be?
- 2012
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Ingår i: Discusiones Filosóficas. - 0124-6127. ; 13:21, s. 65-85
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Can it be better (or worse) for me to exist than not to exist? Several philosophers have denied this, on the ground that if it could, then if I didn't exist, this would have been worse (better) for me, which is absurd. In our paper we argue that these philosophers are mistaken: Claims about the comparative value or disvalue of existence need not imply any absurdities. Such claims, which are of central importance for population ethics and for the status of the so-called Person-Affecting Restriction, can be rationalized if one adheres to the so-called fitting-attitudes analysis of value.
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| 8. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Better to Be than not to Be?
- 2010
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Ingår i: The Benefit of Broad Horizons. - Leiden : Brill Academic Publishers. - 9789004192843 ; , s. 399-414, s. 399-421
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 9. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Millian Superiorities
- 2005
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Ingår i: Utilitas. - 0953-8208 .- 1741-6183. ; 17:2, s. 127-146
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems to be that a radical gap cannot be scaled by a series of steps, if none of the steps itself is radical. We show that this picture is incorrect on a stronger interpretation of value superiority, but correct on a weaker one. Thus, the conclusion we reach is that, in some sense at least, abrupt breaks in such decreasing sequences cannot be avoided, but that such unavoidable breaks are less drastic than has been suggested. In an appendix written by John Broome and Wlodek Rabinowicz, the distinction between two kinds of value superiority is extended from objects to their attributes.
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| 10. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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The Value of Existence
- 2015
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Ingår i: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 424-444
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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