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- Nilsson, Mikael, 1976-
(författare)
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Tools of Hegemony : Military Technology and Swedish-American Security Relations, 1945-1962
- 2007
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This doctoral thesis analyze the process whereby Sweden gained access to American guided missiles during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It also tracks the Swedish efforts to develop guided missiles domestically. The concept of hegemony is used to interpret these processes, the dynamic in the Swedish-American relationship, and its consequences for the Swedish policy of neutrality.Sweden’s domestic guided missile development program, begun in the end of World War Two, met with great difficulties already by the end of the 1940s, and had entered a cul de sac by the early 1950s. The reason for this was a contunuous lack of funding and personnel, as well as a lack of foreign hardware and know-how. By 1947 the United States had largely established its hegemony in Western Europe, and the U.S. government then sought to gain the consent of the Swedish government as well. The U.S. government used its preponderant position, and pressured Sweden to adapt its policies by withholding vital technology from the Swedes. The U.S. refusal to deliver arms to a neutral Scandinavian Defense Union was significant in this respect. Sweden gradually gave its concurrence through a series of steps, most importantly the participation in the Marshall Plan in 1948, and COCOM in the summer of 1951. The confirmation of the U.S. government’s acceptance of Sweden came in the summer of 1952 when was made eligible to buy armaments in the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA).However, Sweden was not granted access to American guided missiles. This was an experience shared with most of the NATO countries (with the limited exception of Britain and Canada). During the course of the 1950s the United States was forced to change its position, due to prodding from the nato allies. The annual nato meetings were used as a platform by the nato countries in this endevour. The U.S. government reversed its non-disclosure policy in 1957 because of worries that its hegemonic position was threatened if it did not provide these weapons to its allies. Guided missile deliveries to Europe was used as a means to keep the alliance together, and to preserve U.S. hegemony in Western Europe.Because of its consent to U.S. hegemony Sweden gained access to U.S. missiles at the same time, and many times even before the NATO countries. Sweden was the first Western European country to purchase Sidewinder (1959) and Hawk (1962), and license manufactured two versions of the Falcon missile. Because of these deliveries the development of Swedish surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles was halted. Sweden was dependent upon the U.S. for deliveries of additional missiles in wartime, and this could have become a problem for Sweden’s ability to defend its territory against Western intrusions, since Sweden’s defense was based on help arriving from the West if Sweden was attacked by the USSR. The Swedish government, using the Royal Air Force Board as a proxy, signed a memorandum of Understanding in 1961 which gave the U.S. government the rigth to any improvements to the Falcon missiles, as well as the right to use them anywhere in the world. Sweden had thus de facto become a part of the U.S. military’s supply line.
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- Nilsson, Mikael, 1976-
(författare)
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Radiokommunikationsutvecklingens betydelse för mobilteleindustrin : Transkript av ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska museet i Stockholm den 12 mars 2008
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The witness seminar “Radiokommunikationsutvecklingens betydelse för mobilteleindustrin” [The Impact of Radio Communications Development on the Mobile Phone Industry] was held at Tekniska museet [The National Museum of Science and Technology] in Stockholm on 12 March 2008 and was led by Professor Jens Zander. The period covered in the seminar was the 1950s to the 1990s. According to the participants at the seminar there was a close relationship between the technological develop-ment in the field of radio communications and the field of mobile telephony in Sweden, and much of the crucial technologies that later went into the mobile telephony systems, such as antennas, transmitters, and receivers, were pioneered in the radio communications field. This was true not only concerning the hardware, but also for the underlying theory about radiowaves. It was also emphasised that much of the success of mobile telephony in Sweden can be explained by the administrative feats at Televerket. The marketing and pricing of Televerket’s services were at least as important as Ericsson’s ability to manufacture the hardware. The participants discussed the development of the NMT and GSM mobile standards, and the role of Sweden regarding the implementation of these standards. Technically, Ericsson’s production of the radio link RL 420 for the Swedish military was very significant because they were later used as base stations in the civilian mobile telephone network. The importance of government orders, most often for the military, was considered to have been very important for Ericsson’s succeses in the mobile telephony market in the 1980s and 1990s.
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- Nilsson, Mikael, 1976-
(författare)
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Sambandssystem 9000 ur ett användarperspektiv : Transkript av ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska museet i Stockholm den 13 mars 2008
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The witness seminar “Sambandssystem 9000 ur ett användarperspektiv” [Communication System 9000 from A User Perspective] was held at The National Museum of Science and Technology in Stockholm on 13 March 2008 and was led by Göran Kihlström. Different aspects of the Swedish Army’s Sambandssystem 9000 were discussed at the seminar, which covered a period from the 1960s to the 1990s. The relationship between the Army and the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV) in the procurement process was discussed, as was the prolonged testing of the equipment involved. Another matter that was discussed at length was the cooperation between the Norwegian firm STK (now Thales) and FMV, and STK’s production of the communications equipment. Earlier systems for Army communication were also dealt with by the participants. The seminar pointed out that the history of the Swedish Army’s communications systems contains successful development, as well as projects that never became operational systems. The reasons for the failures and the successes alike, were found to be a combination of flawed technology and administrative mistakes. One such failed development was the ATLE-IS project which was dropped in the late 1990s. One factor that was identified as having been common for all the projects during this period was that they were all very long in the making, and that they seem to have functioned as a kind of budget regulator. When money was scarce less was put into the development of the communications systems and vice versa.
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- Nilsson, Mikael, 1976-
(författare)
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Staten och kapitalet: Betydelsen av det dynamiska samspelet mellan offentligt och privat för det svenska telekomundret : Transkript av ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska museet i Stockholm den 18 mars 2008
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The witness seminar Staten och kapitalet: Betydelsen av det dynamiska samspelet mellan offentligt och privat för det svenska telekomundret [The State and the Capital: The Implications of the Dynamic Cooperation Between the Public and Private Sphere for the Swedish Telecomunications Wonder] was held at The National Museum of Science and Technology in Stockholm on 18 March 2008 and was led by Professor Bertil Thorngren. The seminar discussion revolved around the collaboration between the state-owned Telecommunications operator Televerket and the private-owned telecommunication firms LM Ericsson and SRA (later ERA) from the 1960s to the 1990s. The seminar revealed that the employees of Televerket never really thought of themselves as being part of a stateowned company, viewing the ’’State’’ as something distant. Day-to-day practices, as well as judicial regulations that prohibits a government Minister from instructing the head of a stateowned firm how to conduct the company’s business, contributed to this. The private firms, on the other hand, used the knowledge gained from their work on military communication systems, ordered and paid for by the government, when private mobile telephony became increasingly important from the 1980s and onwards. Employees were also taken away from Ericsson’s military production and put into the manufacture of mobile telephones. Military orders basically financed the Ericsson’s early work on mobile telephony until the civilian side could finance itself. The seminar agreed that without Televerket’s, and other state agencies’, high demands upon the private firms, the Swedish telecom giant Ericsson would not have existed today.
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