| 1. |
- Cownden, Daniel, et al.
(författare)
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The implications of learning across perceptually and strategically distinct situations
- 2018
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 195:2, s. 511-528
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Game theory is a formal approach to behavior that focuses on the strategic aspect of situations. The game theoretic approach originates in economics but has been embraced by scholars across disciplines, including many philosophers and biologists. This approach has an important weakness: the strategic aspect of a situation, which is its defining quality in game theory, is often not its most salient quality in human (or animal) cognition. Evidence from a wide range of experiments highlights this shortcoming. Previous theoretical and empirical work has sought to address this weakness by considering learning across an ensemble of multiple games simultaneously. Here we extend this framework, incorporating artificial neural networks, to allow for an investigation of the interaction between the perceptual and functional similarity of the games composing the larger ensemble. Using this framework, we conduct a theoretical investigation of a population that encounters both stag hunts and prisoner’s dilemmas, two situations that are strategically different but which may or may not be perceptually similar.
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| 2. |
- de Barra, Mícheál, et al.
(författare)
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How feedback biases give ineffective medical treatments a good reputation.
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of medical Internet research. - : JMIR Publications Inc.. - 1438-8871. ; 16:8, s. e193-
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- BACKGROUND: Medical treatments with no direct effect (like homeopathy) or that cause harm (like bloodletting) are common across cultures and throughout history. How do such treatments spread and persist? Most medical treatments result in a range of outcomes: some people improve while others deteriorate. If the people who improve are more inclined to tell others about their experiences than the people who deteriorate, ineffective or even harmful treatments can maintain a good reputation.OBJECTIVE: The intent of this study was to test the hypothesis that positive outcomes are overrepresented in online medical product reviews, to examine if this reputational distortion is large enough to bias people's decisions, and to explore the implications of this bias for the cultural evolution of medical treatments.METHODS: We compared outcomes of weight loss treatments and fertility treatments in clinical trials to outcomes reported in 1901 reviews on Amazon. Then, in a series of experiments, we evaluated people's choice of weight loss diet after reading different reviews. Finally, a mathematical model was used to examine if this bias could result in less effective treatments having a better reputation than more effective treatments.RESULTS: Data are consistent with the hypothesis that people with better outcomes are more inclined to write reviews. After 6 months on the diet, 93% (64/69) of online reviewers reported a weight loss of 10 kg or more while just 27% (19/71) of clinical trial participants experienced this level of weight change. A similar positive distortion was found in fertility treatment reviews. In a series of experiments, we show that people are more inclined to begin a diet with many positive reviews, than a diet with reviews that are representative of the diet's true effect. A mathematical model of medical cultural evolution shows that the size of the positive distortion critically depends on the shape of the outcome distribution.CONCLUSIONS: Online reviews overestimate the benefits of medical treatments, probably because people with negative outcomes are less inclined to tell others about their experiences. This bias can enable ineffective medical treatments to maintain a good reputation.
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| 3. |
- Enquist, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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One cultural parent makes no culture
- 2010
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Ingår i: Animal Behaviour. - : Elsevier BV. - 0003-3472 .- 1095-8282. ; 79:6, s. 1353-1362
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The ability to acquire knowledge and skills from others is widespread in animals and is commonly thought to be responsible for the behavioural traditions observed in many species. However, in spite of the extensive literature on theoretical analyses and empirical studies of social learning, little attention has been given to whether individuals acquire knowledge from a single individual or multiple models. Researchers commonly refer to instances of sons learning from fathers, or daughters from mothers, while theoreticians have constructed models of uniparental transmission, with little consideration of whether such restricted modes of transmission are actually feasible. We used mathematical models to demonstrate that the conditions under which learning from a single cultural parent can lead to stable culture are surprisingly restricted ( the same reasoning applies to a single social-learning event). Conversely, we demonstrate how learning from more than one cultural parent can establish culture, and find that cultural traits will reach a nonzero equilibrium in the population provided the product of the fidelity of social learning and the number of cultural parents exceeds 1. We discuss the implications of the analysis for interpreting various findings in the animal social-learning literature, as well as the unique features of human culture.
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| 4. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, et al.
(författare)
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Generosity Pays : Selfish People Have Fewer Children and Earn Less Money
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 0022-3514 .- 1939-1315. ; 118:3, s. 532-544
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Does selfishness pay in the long term? Previous research has indicated that being prosocial (or otherish) rather than selfish has positive consequences for psychological well-being, physical health, and relationships. Here we instead examine the consequences for individuals' incomes and number of children, as these are the currencies that matter most in theories that emphasize the power of self-interest, namely economics and evolutionary thinking. Drawing on both cross-sectional (Studies 1 and 2) and panel data (Studies 3 and 4), we find that prosocial individuals tend to have more children and higher income than selfish individuals. An additional survey (Study 5) of lay beliefs about how self-interest impacts income and fertility suggests one reason selfish people may persist in their behavior even though it leads to poorer outcomes: people generally expect selfish individuals to have higher incomes. Our findings have implications for lay decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, as well as for economic and evolutionary theories of human behavior.
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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When is it appropriate to reprimand a norm violation? : The roles of anger, behavioral consequences, violation severity, and social distance
- 2017
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Ingår i: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision making. - 1930-2975. ; 12:4, s. 396-407
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Experiments on economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial consequences that punishment may have on norm violators’ behavior. Going beyond the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed anger, and this effect was mediated by perceived aggressiveness. Thus the same emotions that motivate peer punishers may make them come across as aggressive, to the detriment of their reputation. However, the negative effect of showing anger disappeared when the norm violation was sufficiently severe. Ratings of punishers were also influenced by social distance, such that it is less appropriate for a stranger than a friend to reprimand a violator. In sum, peer punisher ratings were very high for a friend reprimanding a severe norm violation, but particularly poor for a stranger showing anger at a mild norm violation. We found no effect on ratings of whether the reprimand had the beneficial consequence of changing the violator’s behavior. Our findings provide insight into how peer punishers can avoid negative reputational effects. They also point to the importance of going beyond economic games when studying peer punishment.
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
- Funcke, Alexander, et al.
(författare)
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Biased perception may trump rational intention: Most people think they are less corrupt than average
- 2015
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Ingår i: SSRN Electronic Journal. - : Elsevier BV. - 1556-5068.
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- From a game theoretic point of view, a social norm can sometimes be considered as a Nash equilibrium in a coordination game. Here we point out a psychological reason why such a social norm might erode, even if it is beneficial and agents have rational intentions. The reason is a well-established bias in interpersonal perception, the better-than-average effect. Psychological research on this bias has mainly focused on skills and personality attributes, rather than normative behavior. In a series of online surveys, we demonstrate that the better-than-average effect applies also to judgments of the likelihood to engage in petty corruption, a very important domain of social norms. We conclude that this psychological bias may be a factor that contributes to the difficulty of establishing noncorruption.
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| 9. |
- Funcke, Alexander, 1982-
(författare)
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Mathematical models of social norms and petty corruption
- 2015
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Corruption is a problem all around the world, but the extent of the problem varies between countries and situations. In this thesis, I focus on how corruption levels can change when they are culturally determined. For this reason, I study the dynamics of the cultural underpinnings: social norms and conventions.The dissertation consists of six papers. In the first paper, I expand a common definition of social norms. The aim of the extension is to capture the fact that the scope of a social norm may be larger than just a single specific situation. I introduce a similarity measure and develop a mathematical model according to which all situations' social norms are interconnected, and affect each other, but those situations that are most similar and most recent have the greatest normative effect on a current situation. Given this model I test the effect of bringing about norm change by temporarily dismantling institutions and then reestablishing them.In the second paper, I show in a mathematical model how it is possible to design fine and reward mechanisms that make it superfluous for individuals to form beliefs about how others will act. Through this mechanism, it should be possible to circumvent the problem that norm change typically will be successful only if it is synchronized across a large part of the population.In the third paper, I and my co-authors, first conducted a survey. The results of which demonstrate that there is a general tendency among people to consider themselves to be less prone to corrupt behavior than the average person. Such an "everyone-is-better-than-average" effect is a well-established phenomenon in social psychology but not previously demonstrated in the corruption domain. We then show in a mathematical model that such systematic biases in estimation of own versus others' corruption make it more difficult to achieve norm change in the direction of less corruption.In the fourth and fifth paper we again consider the "everyone-is-better-than-average" effect and see how in certain value based groups the effect can be reversed. This changes the insight from the third paper slightly.The last paper considers a classic question of how a collective can succeed in collective action when it is risky to be among the first individuals to act. I and my co-author investigate how the collective can benefit from access to a set of signal acts that signal an individual's level of commitment to the collective cause. The problem is modeled as a threshold model where an individual's inclination to conduct a specific act depends on the previous commitment level in the population.
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| 10. |
- Jansson, Fredrik, et al.
(författare)
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Modeling the Evolution of Creoles
- 2015
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Ingår i: Language Dynamics and Change. - : Brill. - 2210-5824 .- 2210-5832. ; 5:1, s. 1-51
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Various theories have been proposed regarding the origin of creole languages. Describing a process where only the end result is documented involves several methodological difficulties. In this paper we try to address some of the issues by using a novel mathematical model together with detailed empirical data on the origin and structure of Mauritian Creole. Our main focus is on whether Mauritian Creole may have originated only from a mutual desire to communicate, without a target language or prestige bias. Our conclusions are affirmative. With a confirmation bias towards learning from successful communication, the model predicts Mauritian Creole better than any of the input languages, including the lexifier French, thus providing a compelling and specific hypothetical model of how creoles emerge. The results also show that it may be possible for a creole to develop quickly after first contact, and that it was created mostly from material found in the input languages, but without inheriting their morphology.
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