| 1. |
- Bastani, Spencer, Docent, 1982-, et al.
(författare)
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Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization Between Equally Competitive Spouses
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze equally competitive spouses competing for promotion in their respective workplaces and show that an asymmetric equilibrium featuring household specialization can arise. Examples where the asymmetric equilibrium is welfare-superior to the symmetric equilibrium are highlighted. By investing heavily in the career of only one spouse, families reduce the intensity of the rat race of the working environment and obtain less risky consumption opportunities. Our findings suggest that specialization can reflect an efficient response to the competitiveness of the labor market and may arise even when all workers have equal opportunities to succeed in the labor market.
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| 2. |
- Bastani, Spencer, Docent, 1982-, et al.
(författare)
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Simple Equilibria in General Contests
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We show how symmetric equilibria emerge in general two-player contests in which skill and effort are combined to produce output according to a general production technology and players have skills drawn from different distributions. The model includes the Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) models as special cases. Our paper provides intuition regarding how the contest components interact to determine the incentive to exert effort and sheds new light on classic comparative statics results. In particular, we show that more heterogeneity can increase equilibrium effort.
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| 3. |
- Giebe, Thomas, Dr, et al.
(författare)
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Player strength and effort in contests
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In competitive settings, disparities in player strength are common. It is intuitively unclear whether a stronger player would opt for larger or smaller effort compared to weaker players. Larger effort could leverage their strength, while lower effort might be justified by their higher probability of winning regardless of effort. We analyze contests with three or more players, exploring when stronger players exert larger or lower effort. To rank efforts, it suffices to compare marginal utilities in situations where efforts are equal. Effort ranking depends on differences in hazard rates (which are smaller for stronger players) and reversed hazard rates (which are larger for stronger players). Compared to weaker players, stronger players choose larger effort in winner-takes-all contests and lower effort in loser-gets-nothing contests. Effort rankings can be non-monotonic in contests with several identical prizes, and they depend on the slopes of players' pdfs in contests with linear prize structure.
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