| 1. |
|
|
| 2. |
|
|
| 3. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
Emotional reactions to losing explain gender differences in entering a risky lottery
- 2010
-
Ingår i: Judgment and decision making. - 1930-2975 .- 1930-2975. ; 5:3, s. 159-163
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A gender difference in risk preferences, with women being more averse to risky choices, is a robust experimental finding. Speculating on the sources of this difference, Croson and Gneezy recently pointed to the tendency for women to experience emotions more strongly and suggested that feeling more strongly about negative outcomes would lead to greater risk-aversion. Here we test this hypothesis in an international survey with 424 respondents from India and 416 from US where we ask questions about a hypothetical lottery. In both countries we find that emotions about outcomes are stronger among women, and that this effect partially mediates gender difference in willingness to enter the lottery.
|
|
| 4. |
|
|
| 5. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-
(författare)
-
The Accuracy of Mathematical Models of Justice Evaluations
- 2012
-
Ingår i: The Journal of mathematical sociology. - 0022-250X .- 1545-5874. ; 36:2, s. 125-135
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Jasso (1978) proposed a universal law of justice evaluations describing a logarithmic relationship between the perceived injustice of a reward and the ratio between this reward and the just reward. In applications this model is treated as if it were exact, whereas analogous models in psychophysics have empirically established degrees of uncertainty. In this article I make the first assessment of the magnitude of error in the logarithmic model of justice evaluations, using published data and a novel experiment. For the standard application of the model, where just rewards are inferred from justice evaluations, I find that the inherent inaccuracy leads to errors of about 15% on average. I also compared the logarithmic model to 2 nonlogarithmic models. Almost 20% of my respondents made justice evaluations that were more consistent with one of the latter models, suggesting that no single model is really universal.
|
|
| 6. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
The advantage of multiple cultural parents in the cultural transmission of stories
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Evolution and human behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 1090-5138 .- 1879-0607. ; 33:4, s. 251-259
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent mathematical modeling of repeated cultural transmission has shown that the rate at which culture is lost (due to imperfect transmission) will crucially depend on whether individuals receive transmissions from many cultural parents or only from one. However, the modeling assumptions leading up to this conclusion have so far not been empirically assessed. Here we do this for the special case of transmission chains where each individual either receives the same story twice from one cultural parent (and retransmits twice to a cultural child) or receives possibly different versions of the story from two cultural parents (and then retransmits to two cultural children). For this case, we first developed a more general mathematical model of cultural retention that takes into account the possibility of dependence of error rates between transmissions. In this model, under quite plausible assumptions, chains with two cultural parents will have superior retention of culture. This prediction was then tested in two experiments using both written and oral modes of transmission. In both cases, superior retention of culture was found in chains with two cultural parents. Estimation of model parameters indicated that error rates were not identical and independent between transmissions; instead, a primacy effect was suggested, such that the first transmission tends to have higher fidelity than the second transmission.
|
|
| 7. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
The available evidence suggests the percent measure should not be used to study inequality : Reply to Norton and Ariely
- 2013
-
Ingår i: Judgment and decision making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975 .- 1930-2975. ; 8:3, s. 395-396
-
Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this reply, we reiterate the main point of our 2012 paper, which was that the measure of inequality used by Norton and Ariely (2011) was too difficult for it to yield meaningful results. We describe additional evidence for this conclusion, and we also challenge the conclusion that political differences in perceived and desired inequality are small.
|
|
| 8. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
The devil is in the details : Incorrect intuitions in optimal search
- 2010
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 75:2, s. 338-347
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the classic Secretary Problem it has been established that people tend to search somewhat less than is optimal, and a number of explanations have been suggested. Here we propose a new explanation, the Similar-But-Incorrect Intuitions Hypothesis, which says that suboptimal search behavior is to be expected because optimal strategies vary disproportionately with subtle details of the search problem setup, whereas people seem to entertain general intuitions about optimal search. We find support for this hypothesis in experiments on a new search problem, the Explore-and-Collect Problem, where the player collects utility from an option every time it is tried and options can be recalled. Although the optimal search effort in this problem is much smaller than for the Secretary Problem, people tend to search only marginally less. This is not predicted by previous explanations for suboptimal search.
|
|
| 9. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
The grammar of approximating number pairs
- 2010
-
Ingår i: Memory & Cognition. - 0090-502X .- 1532-5946. ; 38:3, s. 333-343
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the present article, we studied approximating pairs of numbers (a, b) that were used to estimate quantity in a single phrase ("two, three years ago"). Pollmann and Jansen (1996) found that only a few of the many possible pairs are actually used, suggesting an interaction between the ways in which people estimate quantity and their use of quantitative phrases in colloquial speech. They proposed a set of rules that describe which approximating pairs are used in Dutch phrases. We revisited this issue in an analysis of Swedish and American language corpora and in a series of three experiments in which Swedish and American adults rated the acceptability of various approximating pairs and created approximating pairs of their own in response to various estimation tasks. We found evidence for Pollmann and Jansen's rules in both Swedish and English phrases, but we also identified additional rules and substantial individual and cross-language variation. We will discuss implications for the origin of this loose "grammar" of approximating pairs.
|
|
| 10. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
The hard problem of cooperation
- 2012
-
Ingår i: PLOS ONE. - : Public Library of Science (PLoS). - 1932-6203. ; 7:7, s. e40325-
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the “hard problem of cooperation” as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.
|
|
